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VINDICATION,

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BRITISH MUSEUM

A VINDICATION

OF THE

RIGHT HONORABLE

EDMUND BURKE's

REFLECTIONS

ON THE

REVOLUTION IN FRANCE,

IN

ANSWER TO ALL HIS OPPONENTS.

LONDON:

PRINTED FOR J. DEBRETT,

OPPOSITE BURLINGTON HOUSE, PICCADILLY.

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A RESIDENCE for the laſt three years at Paris has, I preſume, enabled me to acquire no inconſiderable knowledge of the French Revolution, and of the circumſtances that have attended it. Naturally curious, my obſervation could not have been more happily employed than on this, the moſt extraordinary, as well as intereſting of human events. If totally unconnected with men of any party, and of courſe hoping or dreading but little, from the ſucceſs or failure of their meaſures, I had then been able to form a judgment, under no influence but that of ſtrong truth, the ſame reaſons will, I truſt, at preſent protect me from the imputation of a partial reporter.

I rejoice in the French Revolution, only as it has given birth to the moſt eloquent production I have read in any language. From the nature of its ſubject, and the quality of the

perſons to whom it alludes, men naturally fore-told a multiplicity of anſwers to its ſublime author. Theſe predictions have been fulfilled. Not leſs than ten have appeared already. Of each of theſe, I mean to take diſtinct ſeparate notice; and ſhall begin with a pamphlet entitled "Vindication of the Rights of Men, in a Letter "to the Right Honorable Edmund Burke, "occaſioned by his Reflections on the Revolu-"tion in France."

In the beginning of this lady's work is the following paragraph, which I think not unworthy of notice. "I glow with indignation, when I "attempt methodically to unravel your ſlaviſh "paradoxes, in which I can find no fixed firſt "principal to refute; I ſhall not therefore "condeſcend to ſhew, where you affirm in one "page, what you deny in another, and how "frequently you draw concluſions, without "previous premiſes:—it would be ſomething "like cowardice, to fight with a man, who had "never exerciſed the weapons his opponent choſe "to combat with."

This lady thinks Mr. Burke unable to ſtand againſt her, particularly were ſhe to have the choice of the weapons: this I ſhall not pretend to deny, having implicit confidence in the judgment of the ladies, in all matters of this kind.

kind. Were any *man*, however, to ſet out with declaring he *would* not diſcover the contradictions and falſe concluſions of the writer whoſe principles and reaſoning he diſputes, I ſhould expect but little from him; were he to decline this, (the only method in controverſial writing I am acquainted with) on the ſcore of bravery and generoſity, I confeſs I ſhould be apt to conſider his forbearance ſomething like the diſcreet humanity of a prudent villain, that ſpares his enemy to ſave his own life.

I am now come to the bold aſſertion of a fact, with its tedious panegyrick. "When you are "examining your heart, if it would not be too "much like mathematical drudgery, to which "a fine imagination very reluctantly ſtoops, "enquire further, how it is conſiſtent with the "vulgar notions of honeſty, and the foundation "of morality—*truth*—for a man to boaſt of "his virtue and independence, when he can-"not forget he is at the moment enjoying the "wages of falſehood, and that, in a ſkulking "unmanly manner, he has ſecured himſelf a "penſion of fifteen hundred pounds a year on "the Iriſh eſtabliſhment."

Had th's lady aſſerted ſhe had ſeen the Pope in diſguiſe at St. James's, I could not believe it, although I would not be unpolite enough to

deny it. This penſion Mr. Burke (ſhe ſays) enjoys, under the name of another. As I am too gallant to ſuppoſe any lady capable of a miſchievous invention, I muſt naturally conclude ſhe had her information from ſome gentleman of her acquaintance; and in this caſe, I ſhould be glad to be informed (for this enjoying under another name implies the moſt profound ſecreſy) how the fact was firſt of all known, and why then communicated by this worthy gentleman; for this, what reſources ſuch a man could find in his hypocriſy or his treachery, might be, to hypocrites and traitors, matter of curious ſpeculation.

Before ſhe had advanced a dozen pages, this lady ſeems totally to have forgotten what ſhe had ſaid of Mr. Burke. "I believe you to be, "though a vain, yet a good man; and for this "weakneſs, a knowledge of human nature "enables me to diſcover ſuch extenuating cir-"cumſtances, in the very texture of your "mind, that I am ready to call it amiable, and "ſeparate the public from the private charac-"ter." When men compare this with the former paſſage they will ſee I am not *above* detecting this lady's inconſiſtencies. I am not fond of ungentlemanly abuſe; I have neither the inclination nor the talent for it; but when

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I ſee the ſame perſon, in the compaſs of a few pages, in one place beſtowing the ſhort but emphatic title of a good man; in another, ſparing the greateſt writer exiſting, on principles of generoſity; in another, hardily aſſerting a fact, and connecting it with every breach of common honor, and common honeſty; when I ſee, I ſay, ſuch an incoherent maſs, of treacherous candor, intereſted generoſity, and, if not falſe, at leaſt unneceſſary accuſation, I am, I avow, unable to prſerve the equality of my temper; my partiality for the ſex is obliged to give way to my indignation againſt ſuch ſentiments; I am forced to declare, that this lady is entitled, not to *compliment*, but to *truth*.

The following paragraph is no contemptible inſtance of this lady's pathetic powers: "I "cannot avoid expreſſing my ſurprize, that "when you recommended our form of go- "vernment, you did not caution the French "againſt the arbitrary cuſtom of preſſing men "into the ſea ſervice; you ſhould have hinted "to them that property in England is much "more ſecure than liberty; and not have con- "cealed that the liberty of an honeſt mecha- "nic, his all, is often ſacrificed to ſecure the pro- "perty of the rich, and how cruel it is to be "obliged to pull a ſtrange rope at the ſurly "command

"command of a tyrannic boy?" This entire paragraph is written in a ſtrain of ſuch exquiſite feeling, that without pretending to any ſuperior degree of inſpiration, I will venture to ſay, I could nearly divine the peculiar cauſe of this lady's bitter invective: the preſs was certainly very hot laſt ſummer: this lady, no doubt, has friends.

After regaling her readers with no ſmall portion of female inconſtancy, ſuch as aſſerting in one page, that Mr. Blackſtone was of her opinion, and in the next, ſaying he was of Mr. Burke's, ſhe kindly allows, that Blackſtone thought the *law* leaned to Mr. Burke's ſide of the queſtion: this, however, ſhe qualifies in the true Amazonian ſpirit. "But a blind "reſpect for the law is no part of my creed." The ladies have no doubt the excluſive privilege of ſaying and doing what they pleaſe; but were any of thoſe *gentlemen*, whoſe cruel ſituation this lady ſo feelingly deſcribes in the foregoing paragraph, tempted to adopt her principle, and give life to it; I would not heſitate to aſſure him, that he would have but little occaſion to dread the arbitrary cuſtom of impreſſing men for the ſea ſervice; and inſtead of "ei ng obliged to pull a ſtrange rope, at the "ſurly command of a tyrannic boy," he would be

be likely to partake the ſympathetic intercourſe of virtue in diſtreſs at Botany Bay.

The following paragraph this lady quotes from Mr. Burke: "Good order is the foun-" dation of all good things: to be enabled to " acquire it, the people, without being ſervile, " muſt be tractable and obedient. The magiſ-" trate muſt have his reverence; the laws their " authority. The body of the people muſt not " find the principles of natural ſubordination, by " art, rooted out of their minds. They muſt re-" ſpect that property of which they cannot " partake. They muſt labor to obtain, what by " labor can be obtained." This wholeſome advice, ſo ſtrongly conveyed in a few words, is by this lady called, "contemptible, hard-hearted " ſophiſtry." I know there are perſons who conſider the ſecurity of property a cruel clog upon their induſtry; and with this I beg leave to diſmiſs the vindicator of the rights of men.

Having ſeen advertiſed a book, entitled, "Leſ-ſons to a Young Prince, by an old Stateſman, on the preſent Diſpoſition in Europe to a general Revolution, with the Addition of a Leſſon on the Mode of ſtudying and profiting by the reflec-tions on the French Revolution by the Right Honorable Edmund Burke," I was naturally led

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to the peruſal of it; hoping, from the ſpecious-neſs of its title to find ſomething inſtructive or vulnerable; ſome argument that might tempt me at leaſt to ſuſpend my judgment, or ſome ingenious, but unſucceſsful ſophiſtry, that, fairly preſented to the people, might thoroughly convince them, how uſeleſs are even the efforts of genius to overturn ſtrong truth; they may deface it, but they never can deſtroy its eſſence: The accumulated attacks of perverted talents and miſapplied learning cannot more than change its form, its glorious ſubſtance remains whole and uncorrupt.

In vain I ſearched in this book for ſomething like an idea; all I could diſcover was great ignorance, and groſs miſrepreſentation; by groſs miſrepreſentation I mean, ſtating ſentiments as the author's, the direct contrary of which the author aſſerts. Of this I ſhall give only one ſtriking inſtance: "Government and royalty "are diſplayed, not as ariſing from the mud "and filth of popular interpoſition, but deſcend-"ing from Heaven." Mr. Burke has not left his ſentiments on this head at the diſcretion of the moſt palpable conſtruction; he expreſsly denies the exiſtence of any divine, hereditary, indefeaſible right. Men that wilfully miſrepreſent, are to be blamed but when we find a writer unable by

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any ſophiſtry to turn miſrepreſentation to his advantage, we cannot ſufficiently wonder at the almoſt unnatural connection of ſtupidity and malevolence.

This ſelf-appointed tutor endeavors to inſtruct his Royal Highneſs, through the medium of the moſt unqualified abuſe: this ſort of abuſe is eaſy; a confirmed ideot whoſe ſenſes had been revolting from the moſt obvious ideas of ſenſation can abuſe; a parrot can abuſe; a jackdaw can abuſe; in ſuch company this old ſtateſman would be in his glory: the proof of my aſſertion would be too heavy a contribution on mankind, ſince I know not one man exiſting, whom the ſtrongeſt antipathy could prevail on me to condemn to the reading of this miſerable production.

After I had waded through this undigeſted maſs of ſtupid miſrepreſentation, I accidentally turned over to the preface, where I find this old ſtateſman confeſſing himſelf at the extremity of life, acknowledging himſelf garrulous, and modeſtly owning himſelf a predictor and a prophet. This gives me the opportunity of declaring myſelf indebted to him for the moſt wholeſome leſſon I have perhaps received in my life. If I am ever caught reading a book again, without beginning with the pre-

ſace, may my unwilling ears be eternally aſſailed with all the doating garrulity of a predictor and a prophet. What an unneceſſary exerciſe of my patience ſuch precaution had ſaved me in the preſent caſe. We find this worthy old gentleman concealing his name from printer and publiſher: I was going to give his whole life the title of erring obſervation, and corrupted experience. I am miſtaken—time, it ſeems, has improved his diſcretion.

I am now to take notice of a pamphlet, entitled, "Letter to the Right Honorable Edmund Burke, in reply to his Reflections on the Revolution in France, by a Member of the Revolution Society." This gentleman ſets out in a promiſing manner: addreſſing Mr. Burke, he ſays: "Had your Letter been confined to the affairs of France, I ſhould not have troubled you with a ſingle obſervation; but when we are ſo plainly told, that there is a body of men in this country who wiſh to introduce amongſt us the ſame dreadful confuſions, which have ſo long prevailed in that miſerable kingdom; then, Sir, it is proper that every man who loves our Sovereign Lord the King, and venerates the Britiſh conſtitution, ſhould be upon his guard; and if he has hitherto kept bad company,

"company, it is full time to quit them."—This gentleman conſidered Mr. Burke's alarms either as well founded or not—If he did, why reply to him on the very ſubject and under the title of a member of the Revolution Society? If he did not, why caution every man to be on his guard? Why invite people to quit the bad company they had kept? A member of the Revolution Society convinced by the force of Mr. Burke's reaſoning, had acted more conſiſtently in quitting his company without ſaying a word.

"Admitting, (he ſays) that laſt year Dr. "Price ſtepped far beyond the line of prudence "and propriety; and believing that his Sermon "does not contain the ſentiments of one in a "hundred of the people of England; nay, "more, doubting whether a majority of "the members of the Revolution Society "coincided with him in opinion, although the "reſolutions which he moved after a good "dinner, met with an unanimous concurrence. "Let me aſk you where is the individual, or "body of men, whoſe conduct is not at times "tinctured with abſurdities?" This charitable apology is I fear rather inconſiſtent with Dr. Price's literary pride; ſhould he however adopt it, it will furniſh one ſolitary inſtance, in which this well known apologiſt has ſerved his friend.

This gentleman continues: "Let me ſay, Sir, "in behalf of the Diſſenters, with many of whom "I have had much communication, that they "are a ſober, pious, honeſt, conſcientious com-"munity." Mark this gentleman's conſiſtency! He intimates that the majority of the Revolution Society did not agree with Dr. Price, although the reſolutions he moved met with an unanimous concurrence. Now, ſuch a conduct as this, of publicly aſſenting to what we privately diſapprove, can only be accounted for by inebriety or diſhoneſty. If theſe gentlemen, then, were honeſt, they certainly were not ſober; if they were ſober, they certainly were not honeſt.

I am come to that part of this gentleman's anſwer, where he poſitively aſſerts that Mr. Burke's correſpondence with Dr. Franklin in 1781, was infinitely more reprehenſible than that of the Revolution Society with the National Aſſembly in 1789. The fact I confeſs myſelf unacquainted with; my ignorance, however, carries with it its conſolation, ſince it enables me to correct the ſingular malignity of this gentleman's fortune—that of never having been thanked in his life. I really am obliged to him for the information, ſince it raiſes (if poſſible) the high opinion I have ever entertained of Mr. Burke;

Burke; this however I reſerve for my private ſentiments. The accuſation is I confeſs ſpecious, and the ſophiſtry to ſupport it not ill put; there is ſomething in the general aſſertion of a member of Parliament correſponding with a rebel, that is not badly calculated to impoſe upon a vulgar mind. The caſes are, however, extremely different. In the one we ſee a Club profeſſedly on Revolution principles, correſponding with the government of a country, which (notwithſtanding their charitable notions of univerſal fraternity) we have been taught to conſider for many centuries as our natural enemies; in the other, we only ſee the private correſpondence of two enlightened individuals, whoſe acknowledged object muſt have been the mutual benefit of the two countries. To anſwer for the purity of the Revolution Society's intentions, would be, at beſt, a matter of conſcientious ſpeculation.

This gentleman ſeems much affected, indeed, by Mr. Burke's account of the ſixth of October. "I have read, and with horror and indignation, "the account you have given us of the dreadful "ſixth of October, 1789; I have ſo much "*charity* as to believe, that no ſociety of gentle-"men, with whom I have had the honor to "aſſociate, could have opened a correſpond-

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"ence with men who approved the proceed-
"ings of that day, had they really known at
"the time what horrid exceſſes were commit-
"ted." This gentleman's *charity* ſeems to me of a moſt extraordinary nature; in ſpite of the proverb he writes; in ſpite of the principle he writes for his friends. "I am ſtill to learn (he "ſays) that the National Aſſembly did approve "thoſe proceedings. I will go a ſtep farther; "I ſtill doubt, whether the facts be true or not, "to the extent you have ſtated them; and I do "ſo, becauſe I have no dependence upon your "veracity, for plain and obvious reaſons—I was "among ſome thouſands, who a few years ago "heard you in Weſtminſter Hall give a detailed "and particular account of many cruelties in-"flicted upon certain natives of Bengal, by the "order of a man called Deby Sing. It has "been ſince proved, upon the moſt inconteſti-"ble evidence, that many of the cruelties, and "thoſe in particular which it was moſt offen-"ſive to modeſty and to common decency to "mention, were not committed at all." With reſpect to the firſt of theſe points, I beg leave to be this gentleman's inſtructor. The National Aſſembly did paſs no vote of approbation on the proceedings of the ſixth of October; nor does Mr. Burke aſſert they did; he does not

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even ſay they ſilently approved.—The following extracts from Mr. Burke I beg leave to recommend to his ſecond peruſal. "This, my "dear Sir, was not the triumph of France. I "muſt believe that, as a nation, it overwhelmed "you with ſhame and horror. I muſt believe "that the National Aſſembly find themſelves "in a ſtate of the greateſt humiliation, in not "being able to puniſh the authors of this tri-"umph, or the actors in it." In another place—"The members of your Aſſembly muſt groan "under the tyranny of which they have all the "ſhame, none of the direction, and little of the "profit. I am ſure many of the members who "compoſe even the majority of that body, muſt "feel as I do, notwithſtanding the applauſes of "the Revolution Society." Again—"It is no-"torious that under the terror of the bayonet, "the lamp-poſt, and the torch to their houſes, "they are obliged to adopt all the deſperate "meaſures ſuggeſted by clubs compoſed of a "monſtrous medley of all conditions, tongues, "and nations." In the inordinate deſire of foreign correſpondence, one idea, of no ſmall conſequence in my opinion, ſeems to have eſcaped the attention of the Revolution Society.—A correſpondence, for inſtance, between this club and their worthy brothers of the Jacobins had

ſerved their purpoſes, and preſerved their conſiſtency.

There are men, and charitable men too, that have not heſitated to throw more guilt on the National Aſſembly, than Mr. Burke's well known philanthropy had allowed him to conceive. The ſummarineſs of their proceedings, their ill-timed expedition in a matter that ſo highly involved the national honor, would juſtify an honeſt man, for including them in the general guilt. The laborious examinations of the Chatelet (a popular tribunal, the very tribunal appointed by the National Aſſembly for the purpoſe), after ſix months of uninterrupted reſearch, declared the accuſations againſt two members of the National Aſſembly founded on the moſt inconteſtible evidence;—but thoſe members were Mirabeau and the Duke of Orleans. The ſacrifice of thoſe men, if guilty (and the Chatelet declared they were), would have operated the redemption of the country. No—nothing was to be done by this Aſſembly, that could imply the ſlighteſt deviation from the ſyſtematic impurity of their proceedings. There is but one thing they have not done: they have not yet ſacrificed Monſieur de Cazalez, nor the Abbê Maury, on an invented ſuſpicion. This they have refrained from only from the danger of the attempt.

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As to the facts of this day, which this gentleman doubts, I can, as a ſpectator, atteſt them. I unfortunately loſt not one circumſtance that could draw forth my pity, or excite my indignation.

It is a fact (and no one can diſpute it) that the King and Queen of France were led after the maſſacre of ſome of their Garde du Corps, to Paris, ſurrounded with bayonets, and with women bearing torches in their hands. Their danger was equal, their feelings were different. The ſilent, but eloquent grief of the King, was a ſtriking inſtance of the ſad reverſe of human affairs. He that had been the benign Monarch of an affectionate people, was here tranſformed into the abject ſlave of inſulting oppreſſion. He that had been the voluntary redreſſor of their grievances; was himſelf precluded from the ordinary mercy ſhewn to common criminals;—that, of not inſulting their misfortunes. He that had been the tender father, the generous benefactor of his people; was here tranſformed into the ſilent ſolicitor of his people's pity. He whoſe eyes had been uſed to the refined manners of the moſt poliſhed court in Europe; were here diſguſted with the indecent diſtortion of dancing ſavages. He whoſe ears had been accuſtomed to the emphatic benedic-

tion of Vive le Roy; were here polluted with the frightful utterance of horrid oaths, and helliſh execrations.

The Queen, whoſe perſon even cavilling malice will allow inſpires reſpect, looked here more dignified than ever. In ſpite of circumſtances, in ſpite of misfortune, ſhe never was ſo eminently Queen of France as on the ſixth of October, in the Rüe St. Honorè at Paris.

The Garde du Corps, whom the concurring teſtimony of mankind had eſtabliſhed as the fineſt men, the braveſt warriors, and the moſt poliſhed gentlemen in Europe, were here led, mocked, and inſulted, while their manly countenances eloquently expreſſed the feelings of elevated ſouls, under the preſſure of cruel diſgrace, and unmerited misfortune. Their heads were uncovered, in the midſt of wind and rain (for even the elements conſpired to complete the horrors of this infernal proceſſion); when, perhaps, a butcher's or a taylor's bayonet had inſtantly chaſtiſed the temerity of their attempting to change the awkwardneſs of their poſition *.

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* Theſe Gentlemen furniſh an inſtance of loyalty not to be met with in the annals of the world. Where is to be found the inſtance of men that, with arms in their hands, have

Theſe facts I have ſeen; theſe facts I can atteſt. This was a ſpectacle better calculated to invent, than revive compaſſion; nay, I will venture to aſſert, that there is not one of thoſe gentlemen of the Revolution Society, however he may pride himſelf in the heroic ſtoiciſm of his diſpoſition, that being a witneſs of this day's proceedings, had not forgot the proud apathy of his nature, and condeſcended to the humble character of a feeling man.

How an apology for Mr. Haſtings can be conſtrued into an anſwer to Mr. Burke's Reflections on the French Revolution, I am, I confeſs, unable to conceive. Why it has ſuperſeded in this gentleman's mind all other conſiderations, is a matter of leſs difficulty. Mr. Haſtings is certainly the moſt inviting ſubject in this country for the exerciſe of this gentleman's favorite talent. In ſhort, as long as Mr. Haſtings ſupplies a crime, and his apologiſt writes, he may expect to be perſecuted on every ſubject, in ſpite of pity or conſiſtency.

have let themſelves be maſſacred without reſiſtance? Such however is the caſe of theſe gentlemen, who, it is well known, attempted not to defend themſelves after the King had ordered them not to fire; thus ſacrificing the firſt principle of human nature to their loyalty, and ſaving their country from the horrors of a civil war.

This gentleman threatens Mr. Burke to avow himſelf. "You have one mode of revenge "which I deprecate. I hope it is not libellous "to ſpeak with decent freedom of the acts of a "paſt Houſe of Commons: if it is, you may "bring me before the preſent Houſe. You, who, "if to deliver your thoughts to the public, of pub-"lic men, and public bodies, and public acts, with "the utmoſt freedom, is to be a libeller, have "been the moſt outrageous libeller of the preſent "age; you, I ſay, may complain of this pam-"phlet; if you do, I promiſe you the author ſhall "not flinch from the charge, but will inſtantly "avow himſelf." After ſuch a paragraph as this, does the gentleman flatter himſelf he is not known? People cannot be deceived, as to the author of this pamphlet, as long as there exiſts a man eminently diſtinguiſhed for the perverſion of the human paſſions and the human talents. Does he flatter himſelf that Mr. Burke will complain of this pamphlet? This is the unreaſonableneſs of a man who expects from an enemy what is in the power only of a friend to beſtow.

An inveterate love of writing, which no ſenſe of ſhame can overcome, has been no where more ſtrongly exemplified than in this gentleman. Avowing himſelf totally ignorant of the leading

events

events of the French Revolution, he undertakes to anſwer a book expreſsly written on the ſubject. Apparently unconnected with French opinions, he advances a fact with the moſt daring confidence, that men, the beſt informed, could only ſpeak of, with the moſt cautious conjecture. He ſpeaks of the admiration which the people of France have expreſſed for the character of Mr. Haſtings.

The eſtabliſhing this fact could be, at beſt, but of little uſe to his friend; ſince I would not put the unanimous voice of the French nation in competition with the hundredth part of a vote of the Houſe of Commons of England. It is to be lamented, indeed, that this gentleman cannot ſucceed in eſtabliſhing, at beſt, a harmleſs unavailing fact; and did his aſſertion not belie my own abſolute experience, I ſhould certainly have taken no notice of it. During the time I remained in France, I had occaſion to ſpeak with many men on the ſubject of the impeachment. I do not remember to have met one, who did not agree with the Houſe of Commons, in the propriety of proſecuting a man, they had conceived guilty of the greateſt cruelties, and the moſt unjuſtifiable abuſe of power. This fact I never meant to have mentioned; but it is the genius of this profeſſional apologiſt to provoke

the publication of what was intended to have been with-held.

The reſt of this pamphlet is taken up with matter ſo irrelevant to the ſubject, that it would betray the ſame inconſiſtency, I ſo much condemned, did I attempt to take ſerious notice of it. His abuſe of Mr. Burke is of ſuch a nature as precludes the poſſibility of reply. But what can be expected from a libeller on record? What can be expected from a man who, in ſpite of contempt, is for ever forcing himſelf on the notice of the public? What can be expected from a man who, ſmarting under the moſt public and ſtigmatizing chaſtiſement, cannot reſiſt the incorrigible depravity of his nature, and pitifully deprecates the puniſhment, at the moment he is notoriouſly incurring the penalty? In ſhort, what can be expected from a man, whom the moſt inordinate love of writing and ſpeaking has never hurried into one ſolitary expreſſion that could inſtruct or amuſe? This is the fate of a man, whoſe wit is petulance; whoſe argument is aſſertion; whoſe invective is abuſe; whoſe warmth is intemperance; whoſe zeal is intereſt; whoſe ſolitary talent is that—of diſſerving whom, and what he profeſſes to defend.

In

In a ſmall pamphlet, entitled, "Short Obſer-
"vations on the Right Honorable Edmund
"Burke's Reflections on the Revolution of
"France," I ſee little that can deſerve notice; except the poſitive denial of two facts, as aſſerted in Mr. Burke's book. The firſt is, the abſolute murder of the Garde du Corps, who had been poſted at the Queen's apartment on the 6th of October: the ſecond—that the Queen's bed had been pierced with poignards. As to the firſt of theſe facts, this gentleman is right, and Mr. Burke has been miſinformed. The Garde du Corps is yet living, I myſelf ſaw him at Paris about three months ſince. He, however, owes his life to the ſuppoſition of his death: he certainly had been left for dead, and it was univerſally thought at Paris, for a long time, that he had been dead. It is at beſt a fact of very little conſequence, ſince any concluſion that Mr. Burke may have drawn from it, remains in as full force as if he really had been murdered; having eſcaped by chance, and not by the mercy of the aſſaſſins. From Mr. Burke's well known philanthrophy, one may ſafely aſſert, that few will rejoice more in his own miſtake than he will. As to the other fact; there is every preſumption to ſuppoſe, that the Queen's bed was pierced with bayonets, or poignards, or knives,

or ſomething. It not only was, but is at this moment believed at Paris. I ſaw, at Aix la Chapelle, a Garde du Corps, who had been on duty on the 6th of October, that aſſured me of it. It may in ſome meaſure be inferred from the remarkable expreſſion of the Queen to the deputation from the Chatelet, who had waited on her to receive her informations concerning the 6th of October—*J'ai tout vue, j'ai tout entendu, j'ai tout oublié.*

I really ſee nothing, except theſe two facts, that I can reply to. From the complexion of this gentleman's writing I am more inclined to pity, than deſpiſe him. An unforeſeen derangement in his affairs may have produced in him the ſame effects malevolence produces in others. Men of both theſe deſcriptions write; they agree in many things; they differ, however, in their motives: theſe write to gratify a low and unneceſſary paſſion; thoſe to ſatisfy a ſtrong, an irreſiſtible want.

I am now to make a few obſervations on Dr. Price's Preface and Appendix, which have appeared ſince the publication of Mr. Burke's book. His preface Dr. Price begins thus: "Since the former editions of the following diſ-"courſe many animadverſions on it have been "publiſhed; under the abuſe with which ſome

"of

" of them have been accompanied, I have been " comforted by finding myſelf joined to the " city of Paris, and the National Aſſembly of " France." This, I am ſorry to ſay, is not the language of a philoſopher, who pins his faith on meaſures, not on men. This looks little like the honeſt vindication of a man who conceives himſelf injured. If coincidence in opinion with any men, or bodies of men, be ground of real and honorable conſolation, the acts or proceedings of thoſe men, or bodies of men, muſt be thought, at leaſt, founded on the principles of juſtice, honor, humanity, wiſdom, &c. Now, Mr. Burke has denied that the city of Paris and the National Aſſembly of France have acted on ſuch principles, and in an open, candid manner has ſtated his reaſons for thinking ſo; thoſe reaſons are, I believe, concluſive with moſt men; and will be ſo, until they hear better at the oppoſite ſide of the queſtion. The *argumentum ad verecundium* is, at beſt, unworthy of a man endowed with ordinary powers of reaſoning; and I do think, and ſhall think, until ſuperior reaſon convince me of the contrary, that there never was ſo unfortunate a miſapplication of it as in the preſent caſe.

Dr. Price ſeems to think himſelf very ſeverely treated, that Mr. Burke has applied his words " led in triumph" to the 6th of October, and

not to the 16th of July. I ſhall not pretend to ſay that Dr. Price did not apply them to the 16th of July; but I moſt poſitively aſſert, that had Mr. Burke referred them to any other day than the 6th of October, he had been guilty of moſt glaring impropriety of ſpeech: by propriety of ſpeech I mean the common acceptation of words. Theſe words, I contend for it, "led in triumph," convey in their ordinary meaning an idea of captivity; and I ſhall be much obliged to Dr. Price, or to any other man, that will be kind enough to give me one inſtance in the Engliſh language in which they have been taken in any other ſenſe. It is almoſt needleſs to mention the difference between the words, carried in triumph, and "led in triumph;" the the firſt being always referred to the victor, the ſecond to the vanquiſhed. Now, on the 6th of October, the King was abſolutely led captive to Paris, where he was obliged to remain; on the 16th of July the King went voluntarily to Paris, and voluntarily returned to Verſailles the ſame evening. Should Dr. Price think proper to recant theſe words, mankind will, I dare ſay, receive his recantation with pleaſure.

If Mr. Burke is to be thought ſevere, for having applied words in their ordinary ſignification; Dr. Price is certainly unjuſtifiable, when, without the

the ſhadow of reaſon, he accuſes Mr. Burke of want of candor and moderation. There is in this accuſation of Dr. Price, I contend for it, more real abuſe than any thing contained in Mr. Burke's book; and much leſs reconcileable to the common principles of charity, than any thing I have ever heard. There is in my humble opinion the moſt notorious want of candor in it: ſince Dr. Price (who cannot be ignorant of the Engliſh language) muſt well know, it had been uncandid to have given his words any other acceptation, than that univerſally received and acknowledged by mankind. As to the ſecond part of his accuſation againſt Mr. Burke—want of moderation; I have only to remark, that there are ſubjects on which moderation is almoſt a crime.

Dr. Price aſſerts that Mr. Burke has been decrying popular rights. I will not offend Dr. Price's delicacy, by ſaying, that this is want of of candor: if it be not, it certainly is moſt flagrant miſconception. In what part of Mr. Burke's book has Dr. Price diſcovered this decrial of the rights of men? I defy him to ſhew one ſingle expreſſion in the entire work that can juſtify the malignity of the charge. Mr. Burke on the contrary has ably defended the rights of Engliſhmen, againſt the artful attacks of Revo-

lution clubs, and Revolution makers. Will Dr. Price condeſcend to ſhew that any thing Mr. Burke has decried is a right; and Mr. Burke will be the laſt man in this country that will think of denying it. Until Dr. Price ſucceed in this proof, I muſt be under the neceſſity of treating all his aſſertions on this head as begging the queſtion.

The ridicule Dr. Price wiſhes to throw on Mr. Burke, for lamenting that the age of chivalry is gone, is perhaps as ill founded, as the reſt of his aſſertions. Dr. Robertſon (a name of no contemptible authority) aſcribes the change of manners in the middle ages, which were ſo ferocious, in a great meaſure to the ſpirit of chivalry. This he proves; firſt, from its ingredients, which were truth, honor, punctuality, generoſity, and humanity: ſecondly, from its objects; which were to ſuccour the diſtreſſed, to protect the defenceleſs, to avenge the innocent. This inſtitution Dr. Robertſon calls honorable in its origin, and beneficial in its effects. If to it, is to be attributed the change from ferocious to poliſhed manners, and of courſe the glory of Europe (for Europe never could have been glorious as long as its inhabitants were brutes), where is the abſurdity in ſuppoſing that when the

cauſe

cauſe is deſtroyed, the effect may alſo be deſtroyed? In this I confeſs I ſee nothing ridiculous or inconcluſive.

Dr. Price accuſes Mr. Burke of wonderful inconſiſtency, and this he attempts to prove in the following manner. Since Mr. Burke (ſays he) aſſerts that the people have no right to chooſe their own governors, and caſhier them for miſconduct; how comes he to intimate that a wicked King may be puniſhed, provided it is done with dignity? Dr. Price's fertile genius may aſſiſt him in diſcovering inconſiſtencies, which to men of plain reaſoning never have exiſted. In one place Mr. Burke aſſerts that the Kings of England hold their crown without choice, as long as they perform the legal conditions of the compact of ſovereignty; in another, he ſays, that had it been made clear to him that the King and Queen of France were cruel and inexorable tyrants, and had formed the deliberate plan of maſſacring the National Aſſembly, he ſhould think their captivity juſt. He goes farther, he does not intimate, but he expreſsly ſays, more ſhould have been done in ſuch a caſe. Now if a King form the deſign of maſſacring his ſubjects; this is certainly a breach, the moſt notorious breach of the compact of ſovereignty; but Mr. Burke ſays that the King holds his crown as long as he performs the

compact

compact of ſovereignty; that is, that when he infringes this compact, he may be dethroned; therefore from Dr. Price's own argument does Mr. Burke's conſiſtency, and not inconſiſtency, moſt evidently appear. He is a curious reaſoner, indeed, that would infer from the right to puniſh for the breach of a ſolemn contract, the right to caſhier for miſconduct.

Dr. Price loves to harp upon his favorite word "miſconduct;" he ſays "Mr. Burke is "obliged to allow, that King James the Second "was deprived of his crown for miſconduct." This I deny: it has never been conſtitutionally laid down, that King James was deprived of his crown for miſconduct; on the contrary, the vacancy of the crown is called abdication, and not deprivation; and in no one part of Mr. Burke's book, I will be bound to ſay, can it be found that King James was deprived of his crown for miſconduct.

Dr. Price ſeems to think Mr. Burke convicted on his own aſſertion, when he calls the ſucceſſion to the crown a ſucceſſion by law, and at the ſame time calls the law an emanation from the common agreement and original compact of the ſtate. Dr. Price would therefore infer from this the right in the people to diſſolve the compact.—But this I deny; for in a

compact

compact there muſt be more than one party, and in the compact between the governors and governed there muſt be two: now I contend for it, that as long as the terms of any lawful compact whatſoever are fulfilled, neither party has the right to infringe it. The compact of ſovereignty, then, cannot be diſſolved without the conſent of the Sovereign, and the conſent of the people.

Dr. Price ſays, "that Mr. Burke, in citing "the act for ſettling the crown on William as "an authority againſt the right of people to "chooſe their own governors, cites the very act "which was an exerciſe of that right." Dr. Price ſhifts the argument; for nobody can be ignorant, that the point in diſpute between Mr. Burke and him, is, on Dr. Price's own words, rights acquired to us by the Revolution, and not the exerciſe of a right at the Revolution. Mr. Burke has never diſputed that in this act the ſtrict order of hereditary ſucceſſion was broken; but he inſiſts, on it that ſuch an act was juſtified by the moſt powerful of human reaſons—neceſſity; and by the moſt cogent of all neceſſities—the vacancy of the throne. But taking this act upon the broad baſis of its letter and its ſpirit (the only ground on which it can affect Engliſhmen at this day), let us ſee how the argument will

ſtand.

ſtand. I aſſert that if ſtatute law be of any force in this country, if in ſhort the unrepealed acts of former legiſlatures be binding at this day, nothing can be more concluſive againſt Dr. Price than this very act, the words of which are, "We bind ourſelves our heirs and poſterities "for ever." until this act be repealed (and I truſt it never will), it is of as full force as any other act upon the ſtatute book.

Dr. Price thinks there had been an end to the argument in his favor, had Mr. Burke attended to a ſubſequent act, 6th of Anne, ch. 7. by which it is enacted, "That if any perſon or perſons ſhall, by writing or printing, maintain and affirm, that the Kings and Queens of this realm, with and by the authority of Parliament, are not able to make laws and ſtatutes of ſufficient validity to limit the crown, and the deſcent, inheritance, and government thereof, every ſuch perſon ſhall be guilty of high treaſon." This very act, ſo far from proving any right in the people to chooſe their Governors, is a direct proof of the contrary: for, by the very words of the act, it is the King with the conſent of Parliament that can change the ſucceſſion, and not the people without the conſent of the King. Mr. Burke has no where aſſerted that the ſucceſſion might not be altered

tered by an act of Parliament, we all know that there is nothing poſſible to men, that is impoſſible to Parliament. But in this, I am at a loſs to diſcover any thing, that can carry with it the ſemblance of a proof, in favor of the doctrine of the Revolution Society, that of "electing "Governors, and caſhiering them for miſcon-"duct.".

As to the ſubſtance of Dr. Price's Sermon, I ſhould think it preſumption in me to take notice of it, after the manner in which it has been treated by the Right Honorable Edmund Burke. I ſhall, of courſe, confine my remarks to what Dr. Price has written ſince the publication of Mr. Burke's book; namely, his Preface and Appendix.

Dr. Price has given at large, the "Declara-"tion of the Rights of Men, and of Citizens, by "the National Aſſembly of France." One of the articles, in this pompous catalogue of rights, I ſhall take the liberty of tranſcribing, becauſe it ſeems to be the moſt peculiarly founded in wiſdom, juſtice, and humanity; and becauſe it is the very article which the National Aſſembly has infringed. "The right to property being "inviolable, and ſacred, no one ought to be de-"prived of it, except in caſes of evident public "neceſſity, legally aſcertained; and on con-

" dition of previous juſt indemnity." This deprivation of property, I humbly conceive to be nothing more, than commutation, and this is certainly juſtifiable, inaſmuch as the real benefit to the ſtate is to be preferred to the caprice of the individual: for if the utmoſt value be offered for a property, the proprietor can have no objection to part with it, but from an attachment to its ſituation; and this, when oppoſed to the good of the commonwealth, can be properly called by no other name than caprice. Thus then we ſee, that in caſes of evident public neceſſity, and in no other, the commutation of property may be juſtified, but in no caſe whatſoever can the violation of property be juſtified.

Let us here obſerve the conduct of the National Aſſembly. I firſt of all premiſe, that in all caſes of public neceſſity, where there muſt be ſomething given and not ſomething exchanged, the only mode reconcileable to the common principles of juſtice, for providing for the exigencies of the ſtate, is, a fair contribution to be paid by all the citizens without exception, in proportion to their powers, and not the violation of property of any men, or bodies of men, excluſively of the reſt. If it be otherwiſe than this, all the citizens cannot be ſaid to be equally

protected

protected by the laws, and this protection I take to be the end of all good government. Has the National Aſſembly of France acted in conformity to this principle, the truth of which I truſt will not be diſputed? Has it provided for the exigencies of the ſtate by an equitable contribution? No; it has deprived one body of men of their property, held on the beſt titles, —undiſputed grants, and immemorial uſage! Let us go a ſtep farther: Has this act been even palliated (for juſtified it can never be) by the neceſſity of the caſe? No; for the neceſſities of the ſtate were, by the National Aſſembly itſelf, eſtimated at four hundred millions: this ſum the Archbiſhop of Aix offered in the name of the Clergy, without either the trouble or expence of collecting it: this was refuſed! The Clergy afterwards encreaſed their offer to ſix hundred millions: this was alſo refuſed! Is there, in ſhort, any one part of their own article adhered to by the National Aſſembly? In caſes of deprivation of property, there muſt be "previous and juſt indemnity." Firſt, as to previous indemnity; there was none; the National Aſſembly did not think of granting to the Clergy even the moſt miſerable ſubſiſtence, until long after their property was voted not to be their own. Secondly, as to juſt indemnity, which I con-

ceive to be an equivalent, at leaſt, to what was taken away, there certainly was none; unleſs it can be conſidered that two hundred and fifty pounds is a juſt indemnity for perhaps the loſs of two thouſand.

To what I have juſt ſaid, it may be objected, that this property belonged not to the clergy, but to the nation. I ſhould be glad to know what this word nation (which ſeems of ſuch magic force) means, as contradiſtinguiſhed to its component parts. The clergy are as much the nation as any other body of men, their equal in number: this word nation, then, can only imply the majority; but the majority of any nation, it is well known, have no territorial property at all; therefore the objection reduces itſelf to this ſimple propoſition; thoſe who have no property at all, have the right to diſpoſe of all property, and a decree that had deprived the nobility of their eſtates as well as their honors, had been founded in as much juſtice, as that, which deprived the clergy of theirs. An act that ordained an equal partition of all the eſtates of the kingdom, had been worthy of the National Aſſembly. I proteſt I think it would have been as juſt, if not more ſo, than what they have done; for in the one caſe, all the land holders had been ſufferers, and in the

general

general partition, the clergy would have got ſomething; whereas in the other, there is one body of men evidently ſacrificed to the reſt.

This is the only inſtance I know of, where men, aſſuming the ſacred name of legiſlators, have reduced robbery to a ſyſtem; where the name of philoſophy has been uſed, or rather proſtituted, to ſanctify the moſt violent outrage, on all juſtice and humanity, that has ever diſgraced the annals of mankind. Henceforth the moſt daring acts of violation and oppreſſion are to be juſtified on the ſimple utterance of the words *la Nation!* and the uniform policy of our anceſtors, founded on the ſtrong baſis of wiſdom and honor, and directed to the moſt glorious of human purpoſes—the happineſs of mankind, is now to yield to the new-faſhioned and illiberal doctrines of an aſſembly, that would aſpire to be thought the faithful guarantees for human rights: thus preſumptuouſly erecting itſelf, as it were, into God's choſen council upon earth.

I am now to take notice of that part of Dr. Price's Appendix which refers particularly to the proceedings of the Revolution Society. In the Report of the Committee of the Revolution Society, I have remarked the following paſſage, on which I beg leave to make a few obſervations:

" The Committee concluded their Report " with congratulating the Members of the " Society, as Britons, and Citizens of the World, " upon that noble ſpirit of civil and religious " liberty, which had, ſince the laſt meeting, " ſo conſpicuouſly ſhone forth on the continent, " more eſpecially on the glorious ſucceſs of the " French Revolution; and with expreſſing their " ardent wiſhes, that the influence of ſo glorious " an example may be felt by all mankind." This is preciſely to ſay, that thoſe worthy gentlemen ardently wiſhed for a revolution in every part of the globe. At this inſtant, the French have no conſtitution: they themſelves allow it! they certainly had none when the Report of the Committee was made: they had only a revolution. What example then could France give to the world? not the example of a conſtitution, for ſhe had none, not the example of a reformation, for it is allowed, on all hands, ſhe deſtroyed, ſhe did not reform: it muſt then have been the example of a revolution. Is there an Engliſhman that wiſhes well to his country, that would deſire a revolution in England, at this day? I truſt there is not, as I alſo truſt there is not one in ten thouſand that is not a well wiſher to his country.

The Duke de Rochefoucault begins his letter

letter to Dr. Price, with the following compliment. "It belonged to Dr. Price to propoſe a "motion, tending to pay to liberty the faireſt "homage, that of national prejudice." It is, with me, highly problematical, that the extinction of national prejudices would, in any manner, contribute to the glory, or happineſs of this country. There certainly are prejudices, that give great energy to the ſoul, and an Engliſhman that conceives himſelf, in every reſpect, ſuperior to a Frenchman, is not a leſs uſeful member of ſociety, than he that does not. It is well known that the rivalſhip exiſting between the two countries is, in a great meaſure, owing to their mutual prejudices. Now, ſome men of great depth of thought, and great learning, have not heſitated to declare that a rivalſhip between France and England is not only uſeful, but neceſſary. The fall of Rome has been, before now, aſcribed to the deſtruction of Carthage—that is to the want of a rival. This is, however, a diſcuſſion too high for my poor comprehenſion, and I moſt cheerfully conſign it to the uſeful lucubrations of men of talents and information.

In the addreſs of the Revolution Society, to the Members of the Patriotic Union, at Liſle, are the following lines. "France is taking the

"lead

"lead, and Britain will be left behind, if not "provoked by the example of France, to "correct abuſes that are every day growing "more palpable." This is not the extinction, but the corruption of national prejudice: theſe are not the cautious words of neceſſary reform, but the hardy expreſſions of dangerous innovation; this is not the natural eloquence of men ſmarting under abuſes, and ſuffering under injuries, but the artful language of miſchievous revolt. The danger of the example is only to be equalled, by the obſtinacy, with which it is held out. France is taking the lead! In what? Are her manufactures improved? Is her commerce extended? Is her army better diſciplined? Is her navy more flouriſhing? Is property more ſecure? Is juſtice more ſpeedy? Are her inhabitants more induſtrious? Are they more happy? Are they more civilized? No.—Her manufacturers are ſtarving, her commerce is at a ſtand, her armies are licentious, her navy is almoſt fallen to contempt, property, inſtead of being ſecure, is violated, juſtice, inſtead of being ſpeedily obtained, is either not obtained at all, or infamouſly perverted, her inhabitants, inſtead of being more induſtrious, are more lazy, inſtead of being more happy, they are abſolutely miſerable, inſtead of being more civilized, they

have

have degenerated into the moſt ferocious brutes. In what then has France taken the lead, in what is Britain left behind? France has taken the lead in injuſtice and inhumanity, and Britain will be ever left behind.—When Monſieur de Foulon aſked for a public trial, and a public accuſer, he was refuſed: was this juſtice? When Monſieur de Foulon (whoſe grey hairs, if they could not have commanded reſpect, ſhould at leaſt have excited compaſſion) was led to the ſcaffold, and executed amidſt the cheerfulneſs of the ſpectators, was this humanity? When ſavage reſentment (that death in general diſarms) was continued to the almoſt withered remains of this unfortunate old man, was this humanity? When Monſieur de Berthier (whoſe only crime was that of being ſon-in-law to Monſieur de Foulon) was forced to kiſs the mangled head of his murdered father-in-law, was this humanity? When he himſelf was dragged to execution, unaccuſed, unheard, unpleaded, was this humanity? Theſe are the people that are to give an example to the world! Theſe are the people that have left Britain behind!—they have indeed—From what I myſelf have ſeen, I will venture to ſay they have left all other nations far behind, in their ſpeculations on inhumanity.

It is really inconceivable with what ardor theſe humane revolutioniſts burſt into the moſt fulſome panegyrics on the National Aſſembly, and the people of France. "Oh, heavenly "philanthropiſts! well do you deſerve the ad-"miration of your own country, as well as all "countries! You have already determined to "renounce, for ever, all views of conqueſt, and "all offenſive wars." Dr. Price's prophetic ſpirit may give him the excluſive privilege of diſpenſing with his reaſon; but I, who am a man of moderate capacity, and little bleſſed with the glowing influence of pulpit inſpiration, muſt content myſelf with humble probability, when certainty cannot be acquired. When I cannot prove a thing poſitively, I ſhall endeavour, to elucidate it by analogy. From what circumſtances in the hiſtory of the two countries are men led to ſuppoſe that the French have renounced all views of conqueſt, and all offenſive wars? What circumſtances in the preſent Revolution can juſtify ſuch a conjecture? Have they never been the aggreſſors? Has the deſire of conqueſt been unknown to them? Have no nations ſmarted under the fatal effects of their unlimited ambition? Yet all theſe paſſions, theſe inveterate habits, are to be renounced for ever,

ever, and mankind are henceforth to hear of the French nation, only through the medium of heavenly philanthropy; only in the ſacred capacity of mediators, and peace makers. And what pledge have we for this? the aſſertion, forſooth, of the National Aſſembly: what ſecurity for the performance of this promiſe, that is vouched only by the intereſted moderation, the treacherous ſanctity, the hypocritical candor of theſe *heavenly* reformers.

The Revolution Society ſeems fond of arrogating to itſelf the language of omnipotence. In one day it has annihilated, for the French, the acknowledged prejudices, the prevailing paſſions, the uniform policy, the uninterrupted experience of thirteen hundred years: while, with as much hardineſs, this club would ſpeak the ſenſe of ſeven millions of people. But this were a pitiful revolution indeed, if undiſtinguiſhed by events, and effects, unheard of in the annals of mankind; even Mirabeau, the chaſte Mirabeau! whoſe great talents have been exerciſed in inventing vices; and whoſe long and induſtrious experience has been employed in ripening them into practice, is now to be the pure patriot of a patriotic people. He who had formerly trampled on every civil and domeſtic duty; he who had

been the corrupt, the treacherous ſpy on mankind, is now, by a political miracle, become the immaculate leader of an immaculate Revolution. This is the man, (whoſe entire life has been a libel on the moſt obvious principles of honor and honeſty) under whoſe guidance the moſt ambitious, the moſt irritable people under heaven, are to reject, even the weakneſſes of human nature, and act upon the benign, the apoſtolic principles of univerſal fraternity.

There is ſomething in the character of this man, which, not one ray of virtue has redeemed, from the frightful uniformity of vice, that is difficult to be conceived by thoſe who have only heard of the ordinary crimes of mankind: a maſterly genius, and extenſive conception, in the promotion of wickedneſs, that has ſeldom been diſcovered in the moſt enlightened zeal for virtue: a ſpirit of enterprize in any attacks upon humanity, that has been rarely found in the moſt glowing moments of romantic chivalry: yet ſuch a mean and abject ſenſe of perſonal danger as is reconcileable only to a man, who lives on the profeſſed principles of being dreaded, being hated and deſpiſed. This is to be the venerable author of a conſtitution from which ſuch miraculous effects are not predicted, but aſſerted; this the

ſpeaker,

ſpeaker, not the actor, in a revolution which I ſhall call by no other name, than the ſpurious offſpring of cowardice and ambition *.

That

* The fathers of the preſent Revolution in France, Monſieur le Duc d'Orleans, and Monſieur de Mirabeau, are not much diſtinguiſhed for the irritability of their feelings: of this it may not be unentertaining or improper to mention two ſtrong and well known inſtances. On the Duke's return from England to Paris, he loſt no time in making his viſit of congratulation to the King, on his new and enchanting ſituation, and to which he had ſo powerfully contributed. Among the great variety of compliments at court, there was one to the Duke of Orleans, which drew the attention of all preſent, from the emphatic ſerioufneſs with which it was urged—The words in French are "Gueux pourquoi oſes tu paroitre ici." This new-faſhioned panegyric the Duke received with all the diſpaſſionate temper of a ſtoic, whom neither threats nor flattery can move.—Monſieur d'Oglar, the author of this poliſhed eulogium, ſeemed to have conſidered the Duke's philoſophy as rather ill-timed, and that his Royal Highneſs might be the more fully convinced of the ſincerity of his intentions, Monſieur d'Oglar's body was ſeveral times ſeen, by the entire court, in contract with the Duke's, until the frequency of theſe obſequious reproaches rendered his Grace's ſtay, if not diſhonorable, at leaſt highly inconvenient. The laſt of theſe perſonal compliments was addreſſed with ſuch irreſiſtible energy that the Duke manfully exclaimed, he would take the opinion of his council on the matter, and be determined by them on the manner in which he was to act. Gentlemen of his Grace's

That the French government wanted correction and reformation, no one in any degree acquainted with it, will diſallow. Mr. Burke has been far indeed from blaming the French for aſſerting their rights; on the contrary, he expreſsly ſays, that the day on which the States met, was the moſt glorious that France had ever ſeen: had they followed the inſtructions of their cahiers, they had fulfilled the noble and important taſk of their miſſion—that of relieving

Grace's diſpoſition have, it ſeems, no ready-made feelings, any thing we are to expect from them in that line muſt be beſpoke; they are literrally above their trade; they diſdain to work for themſelves. His Royal Highneſs's council (thoſe truſty guardians of his private honor, thoſe liberal coiners of his feelings), after much deliberation decided, with only one diſſenting voice †, that his Royal Highneſs ſhould not fight! Monſieur de Cocherel, the firſt member to the National Aſſembly, from the colony of St. Domingo, a man of truth, honor and ſpirit, after much provocation, threatened to regale Monſieur de Mirabeau with a horſe-whipping (in French cinquante coups de baton). This friendly offer was received by Monſieur de Mirabeau, with the moſt chriſtian forbearance—The firſt of theſe inſtances is mentioned with the greater propriety, after the well-known gallantry of a King's ſon, which in every country I have ſeen, has cauſed the livelieſt admiration.

† Monſieur de la Touche.

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the diſtreſſes of twenty-five millions of people. Let us ſee what thoſe cahiers were—they were the full, the candid, the uninfluenced ſtate of grievances, with the means of their redreſs throughout the kingdom. Has the National Aſſembly acted in conformity to thoſe inſtructions? No; but thoſe inſtructions were the ſentiments of *all* the people—the National Aſſembly then cannot be ſaid to be the organ of the people. To this it may be objected, that repreſentatives are not obliged to obey the dictates of their conſtituents: certainly they are not; becauſe a repreſentative, in his legiſlative capacity, is not to conſider himſelf as acting for any particular ſpot, but for the country at large. This caſe cannot, however, apply to the repreſentatives of the people, in the National Aſſembly of France, ſince there is not one ſingle cahier throughout the kingdom, that can authorize their proceedings.

The National Aſſembly are, notwithſtanding the illegitimacy of their conduct, ſtiled the glorious vindicators of the people's rights. They are the fertile ſubject for unlimited panegyric; their proceedings the ground for unheard-of congratulatory addreſſes. Addreſſes are, it ſeems, become the faſhion; their leading characteriſtic is want of ground, on which they might

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be formed: there are different ſorts of theſe addreſſes, inaſmuch as they may differ in their materials and their end. Some may be framed for the purpoſes of ill-deſigning perverted ambition; others for fulſome and diſguſting flattery. The former may be (and indeed generally are) framed by men of great talents and cultivated underſtandings; the latter by corrupt and irredeemable ſtupidity. Mankind will, I truſt, deſpiſe the one, as much as they deteſt the other.

It is, to a thinking mind, cauſe of no ſmall wonder, that Dr. Price, who ſo ſtrenuouſly enforces the obſervance of religious worſhip, ſhould have been ſo forward in addreſſes and congratulations to the National Aſſembly of France, whoſe leading members are ſo diſtinguiſhed, not for their neglect, but contempt of all religious worſhip. It were ſufficient to name Monſieur de Mirabeau, the Meſſrs. Lameth, Monſieur Menou, with many others. To ſay that any one of theſe gentlemen had never ſeen the inſide of a church, on a pious principle, would not, perhaps, be too bold an aſſertion: the moſt of theſe gentleman would have, perhaps, never bluſhed, but on the imputation of Chriſtianity. As to the people of France, they, it is well known, are not religious; they are, however,

wonderfully ſuperſtitious—it is not that they love God, but that they fear the devil.

I know not what Dr. Price's principles of charity may be—I am ſure I have always heard it received as a maxim not to ſpeak ill of the dead, *de mortuis nil niſi bonum.* He, however, is of a different opinion, as may be collected from his own words. In one place he ſays, "I have lived "to ſee thirty millions, indignant and reſolute, "ſpurning at ſlavery, and demanding liberty, "with an irreſiſtible voice:" in another, "an "enlightened and virtuous country muſt be "free." In this aſſertion one may diſcover a learned and charitable eulogium on the anceſtors of the National Aſſembly, &c. during the period of thirteen hundred years. As theſe gentlemen of the Revolution Society have been kind enough to favor us with a new ſyſtem of politics, they will, in future, I dare ſay, furniſh us with a new ſyſtem of ethics, in which the tender affections of the human heart are to be treated as pitiful and erroneous. The National Aſſembly of France, is, in the minds of theſe gentlemen, beyond the reach of ordinary praiſe; they are mounting, by infallible means, to the higheſt heaven; but their unfortunate anceſtors are by this time, diſpoſed of in another manner.

Before I conclude my remarks on Dr. Price's Preface and Appendix, I ſhall take the liberty of adverting to one expreſſion, which, from its peculiarity, ought not to paſs unnoticed. "After "the addreſs of the Revolution Society had "been voted, it was ordered to be conveyed to "the Duke de Rochefoucault, at Paris, with a "letter, requeſting him to preſent it; and at "the ſame time intimating, that the Society "conſidered the *National Aſſembly as acting* "*for the world*, as well as for the great king-"dom it repreſented." The accumulated arrogance of long ſubſiſting and inſulting enmity could ſcarcely forge a more humiliating expreſſion than this! The National Aſſembly of France acting for the entire world! What! the diſguſting mixture of weakneſs and effrontery, ſuperſtition and impiety, ignorance and preſumption, legiſlation and injuſtice, folly and cruelty, is to direct the underſtandings, and reform the manners of mankind! henceforth miſchievous boys, in legiſlation, are to become the pure and enlightened law-givers of the world! notorious violators of property are to be the ſevere aſſertors of human rights! levellers of all diſtinctions are to be the ſcrupulous guardians of all honors! the protectors of unheard-of cruelty are to be the guarantees for humanity! and religion itſelf

ſelf is to find protection and ſupport in the ruins of the church! thoſe who had diſhonoured and beggard the preachers of the goſpel, are to be the dignified and charitable truſtees for religion, over this habitable globe!

Had this been the expreſſion of ſome unknown individual, I ſhould have ranked him with the weak and ignorant, thus ſaving his reputation at the expence of his underſtanding. But theſe political ſaints are precluded from the honourable reſource of this healing alternative, and by the light of their underſtandings, men diſcover the impurity of their hearts. I like not, for my own part, theſe ſelf-denominated zealots of freedom, it would be as difficult to perſuade me of the purity of their intentions, as of the propriety of their conduct. That there be men among them of great goodneſs and worth, I make no doubt, but their indolent rectitude has yielded to the buſy ſpirit of enlightened corruption.

I here beg leave to conclude my remarks on Dr. Price's Preface and Appendix. As to the toaſts given by Dr. Price, or any other man, I have little to obſerve; it would be giving them too much conſequence indeed, to make them the ſubject of a ſerious diſcuſſion. Moſt men have their jovial moments, when they are but

little calculated for the purpoſes of artful and malicious ſpeculation. It is the privilege only of a few, indeed, to be *cunning* in their *confuſion.* From the effuſions of the table then, *much*, I think, cannot be dreaded. But, ſhould Dr. Price continue in the habits of delivering political ſermons, at the Old Jewry, or at any other place, I proteſt I ſhall not heſitate to pronounce him better qualified for the boiſterous duties of a toaſt maſter, than the mild and tranquil concerns of a preacher of the goſpel.

A gentleman, ſigning himſelf Joſeph Towers, L. L. D. has given a moſt copious Appendix to a pamphlet, entitled, "Thoughts on the "Commencement of a new Parliament." In this Appendix he propoſes to make many obſervations on Mr. Burke's Reflections on the Revolution in France. I had expected, in this work, to find ſomething like recantation or repentance, ſomething that might ſoften the conduct of the Revolution Society, by the candid confeſſions of this gentleman, who ſtiles himſelf a member of it; or, at leaſt, ſome ingenuity of conſtruction that might afford a temporary ſhelter to depravity or abſurdity. I have been diſappointed—I have found ſtubbornneſs inſtead of recantation, obduracy inſtead of repentance,

and

and hardy adherence to firſt aſſertions, inſtead of pliant ingenuity in the conſtruction of them. To the greater part then of this gentleman's book, I have already attempted to reply; I ſhall, however, cite from him ſome paſſages that I conſider deſerving of peculiar notice.

A natural antipathy to Kings is, it ſeems, one of the great ingredients in the new doctrines of the Revolution Society. Dr. Towers's paragraph on this head, is worthy of ſome notice. "It "is truly wonderful, that ſuch great numbers of "the human race ſhould ſubmit, with ſo much "ſervility, to men inveſted with the regal dig-"nity, who are totally unworthy of the office "they bear, and to whom at the ſame time, "powers are given, that it would be unſafe to "truſt even to the beſt and wiſeſt of the hu-"man ſpecies." To analize this paſſage, in the moſt charitable manner, we ſhall find it contains nothing more nor leſs, than the unqualified principle of electing governors, and caſhiering them, at diſcretion. Should a Prince of weak underſtanding, for inſtance, come to the throne, in the due order of hereditary ſucceſſion, it would excite this gentleman's wonder that his people were obedient to him, and on his principle, they could do nothing better than caſhier him, without the ſmalleſt ceremony.

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This gentleman laments that powers are given, that ought not to be intruſted to the beſt and wiſeſt of the human ſpecices. This muſt certainly allude to England, for in France, all theſe gentlemen ſeem to agree, that the powers were not given but uſurped; now, for my own part, I have much more confidence in the wiſdom of the Engliſh Parliament, than in the unwarrantable wiſhes of any body of men, who diſcover ſuch tender anxiety for the intereſts of mankind.

This gentleman concludes a long paragraph in a manner ſo derogatory from the dignity, that ought to be ever attendant on the executive power, that I muſt take the liberty of telling him, this is not the conduct of a citizen, who really loves freedom, but the ſturdy turbulence of a man who hates order, for order and good policy are daggers to men of this deſcription: theſe are the cruel impediments to their proſperity. Indeed the great difference between Mr. Burke and theſe gentlemen ſeems to be, that he thinks licence dangerous, they think freedom inſupportable. I have been ever taught to conſider a proper reſpect from the people to the Sovereign, not only uſeful, but neceſſary in every well regulated government. Any expreſſions that may tend to diminiſh, in the people's

minds,

minds, this reſpect, I hold not as the language of liberty but of ſedition, and, in ſuch caſes, I would not heſitate to adviſe my fellow citizens, in the emphatic words of the Roman Poet, *Hic niger eſt, hunc tu Romane caveto.*

Among other things, which Mr. Burke ſays he ſhould look for in the new liberty of France, before he offered any congratulations upon it; one is, that it was combined with the diſcipline and obedience of armies—This ſimple propoſition, ſo intimately connected with the happineſs of mankind, I had conſidered beyond the reach of ſophiſtry: it furniſhes, however, cauſe of much lamentation to this Mr. Towers, and the manner in which he attempts to diſprove it, is (it muſt be allowed) ingenious—Standing armies, he ſays, are not neceſſary, therefore diſcipline and obedience are not neceſſary in ſtanding armies—This is a ſpecies of reaſoning I confeſs myſelf unacquainted with; there may yet appear a Revolution logic, in which the common modes of proof, by juxta-poſition, and intermediate ideas may be ſcouted as erroneous: we may yet expect to find, from the reforming pen of theſe unkingly philoſophers, ſome propoſitions of great moment, ſuch as (for inſtance) that humanity, talents, moderation, &c.

&c. are qualities not neceſſary in Kings, becauſe Kings are not neceſſary.

This gentleman farther aſſerts, that the ammunition of pamphlets is much more neceſſary in an army, than the ammunition of cartridges; "becauſe theſe tend to make them inſtruments, "while thoſe tend to make them good men and "good citizens." How far this new ſpecies of tactics may be approved by the military men in England, is matter of curious conjecture. In what manner his Royal Highneſs the Duke of York, or any other good officer, may reliſh in his ſoldiers a preſent of pamphlets, inſtead of a preſent of arms; reports on the rights of men, inſtead of the report of gunpowder; the grounding of arguments, inſtead of the grounding of firelocks, is yet to be determined, notwithſtanding this new doctrine, by which ſoldiers are to become good and virtuous citizens. I am yet inclined to think, that the old diſcipline, and the old ammunition, will be continued; in ſpite of the learned ſuggeſtions of Dr. Towers, or any other Doctor.

This gentleman ſays, that "much of Mr. "Burke's reaſoning concerning the proceedings "of the National Aſſembly, reſpecting the "lands of the church, is inconcluſive; becauſe it "is grounded on a principle that few will allow

"beſides

" beſides himſelf; namely, that the poſſeſſions " of the church were to be conſidered in the " ſame light, and as equally ſacred with pri- " vate property." The inconcluſiveneſs of Mr. Burke's reaſoning this gentleman would prove thus: Lands appropriated, ſays he, to any claſs of men for public duties, or public ſervice, may, with great propriety, be confiſcated by the legiſlature. This is the moſt expeditious convenient kind of reaſoning I have ever heard. Now I, in my turn aſſert, firſt, that the lands of the church ought to be conſidered as ſacred as private property; and, ſecondly, that the government or legiſlature has no right to ſeize or confiſcate them. This gentleman aſſerts one thing, I another; he attempts no proof; I ſhall.

I conſider that all property is to be held equally ſacred, as long as the titles to it are undiſputed, and as long as the conditions on which it may be held are fulfilled. Now let us apply this principle to the church property. Firſt, it was held, as I have before ſaid, on the beſt of all poſſible titles—undiſputed grants, and immemorial uſage. Secondly, the condition on which it has been held; namely, that of performing certain public duties for the community, has been invariably fulfilled; and thus, I ſay, as long as thoſe duties are performed, and the

performance of them is the condition on which the property is held, no government under heaven has the right to ſeize or confiſcate it. If, for inſtance, lands be given to an individual, to be held by him and his heirs, for ever, or to a corporation, and their ſucceſſors, for ever, on condition for the performance of certain ſervices, ſuch as keeping a high road in order, &c. this individual and his heirs, or corporation and its ſucceſſors, have a right to hold the lands as long as the ſervices are performed. Where then is the difference between this caſe, and the appropriation of lands to the uſe of the church; except in this, that the ſervices to be rendered by the clergy are of a higher nature?

For the proof of the ſecond part of my propoſition, I have to premiſe, that neither in law or equity can there be ſeizure or confiſcation, without ſome previous act, done by the holders, that might amount to a forfeiture; nay, more, this act muſt be publicly tried and publicly proved. Let us apply this principle alſo, to the confiſcation of the church lands. It has never been even ſuggeſted that the clergy had done any act that malicious ingenuity could conſtrue into a forfeiture; there has been no public trial, no public proof of any ſuch act; therefore the lands of the clergy ought not to

have been ſeized or confiſcated; and when any man attempts to ſay that the government of a country has a right to ſeize or confiſcate on any other terms, ſuch a man is, I ſay, a political blaſphemer. No good government will arrogate to itſelf a right that carries in its principle the deſtruction of all law, juſtice, and equity; and any man that arrogates ſuch a right for them, without either their knowledge or conſent, is, I again repeat it, a political blaſphemer.

In their proceedings on this queſtion, the National Aſſembly did not attempt to preſerve the ſlighteſt colouring of juſtice or humanity. In juſtice I have attempted to prove, they had no right to ſeize or confiſcate at all; but their inhumanity is not to be equalled, in depriving the preſent poſſeſſors; in leaving an enlightened body of men, moſt of them beyond the power of bodily labour, without the ſmalleſt reſource; for what has been decreed for their ſubſiſtence, is in fact, to numbers of them, no ſubſiſtence at all, ſince they owe more than the fee ſimple of ſuch a ſubſiſtence is worth. To this it may be objected; why have they not lived within their income? This objection, taken in its ſtrongeſt ſenſe, can never be ſufficient reaſon for ſeizure or confiſcation; but when we know

that moſt of the debts incurred, have been occaſioned by the moſt humane cauſes, ſuch, for inſtance, as alleviating the miſeries of the poor, or, what is well known, ſupporting long trains of indigent relations, then the objection, far from giving a right to confiſcate, ought to be the ſtrongeſt reaſon for protection. What would an Engliſhman ſay, who had ſeen a man hung upon an *ex poſt facto* law? would he not execrate the government that permitted it? What muſt he think of the government that firſt ſuggeſted it?

When Mr. Burke ſeems very reaſonably to dread, in conſequence of the late Revolution in France, a decadence in trade and learning, &c. this gentleman aſſerts that ſuch a ſuppoſition is as probable as the tales in the Arabian Nights Entertainments. This compariſon is neither illuſtrative nor polite; ſince any man, who has ever read one page of any of Mr. Burke's productions, cannot imagine him capable of making an impoſſible ſuppoſition. But it is inconceivable with what cheerfulneſs theſe political Doctors diſpenſe with any little portion of reaſon that nature may have given them, in order to aſſume the tone of high-ſounding aſſertion! Let us examine where the impoſſibility of theſe ſuppoſitions exiſts. What is the principal

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cauſe of great increaſe of trade? great punctuality, and great confidence: the want of theſe is, of courſe, the cauſe of its decreaſe. Now, ſince the French have broken faith with part of their own community, where is the abſurdity in ſuppoſing they may break faith with ſtrangers? What has moſt contributed in every country to the flouriſhing ſtate of learning? the protection and encouragement afforded to the learned. Now in France, they have beggared and degraded the moſt enlightened body of men among them. Where then is the abſurdity in dreading the decline of learning in that wretched country?

This gentleman is very laviſh indeed of his encomiums on the National Aſſembly, and the people of France. On what grounds either the one or the other can deſerve praiſe, is better known to him than to me. I have myſelf ſeen ſuch circumſtances, as might juſtify me in aſſerting, that no nation whatſoever has fallen to ſuch a frightful point of inhumanity as the French. The National Aſſembly, that has ſcarcely acted, but for the cruel purpoſe of unwarrantable proſcription, merits little the praiſe of any man unaccuſtomed to ſpeculate on the improbable, and, at beſt, pitiful advantages, that might ariſe to himſelf, from the cruel ſacrifice,

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the certain miſery, and incalculable loſs of a reſpectable, but unfortunate order of the community.

It is a fact of the greateſt notoriety, that the Chatelet, a tribunal of life and death, ſat in terror of their lives, and that their decrees were not the offspring of juſtice and mercy, but the violent mandates of a blood-thirſty mob. Of this, there is a melancholy inſtance, in the fate of the unfortunate Marquis of Favras, whom the moſt infamous proſecution, moſt partially conducted, had not been able to condemn, on any grounds of law or juſtice. When I reflect on the entire conduct of this perſecuted man, throughout the whole affair, but particularly in his laſt moments, I am ſtruck with admiration and delight, at the dignity and force of innocence, in the moments of humiliation, and in the hour of death. Yet this was the man, the ſacrifice of whom gave ſafety to his tribunal, by indulging the people; this was the man, who, unconvicted on any evidence, was nevertheleſs led to execution through ſtreets, which crowds of ſpectators had almoſt rendered impaſſible; while his undeſerved fate had rent the hearts of men endowed with the ordinary feelings of humanity.

There was ſomething in the conduct and ſituation

tion of this unfortunate gentleman, that, in any other country, would, I will be bold enough to aſſert, have diſarmed even the juſt reſentment of an injured people; but in that, produced much contrary effects. In proportion as he was humbled, they were exalted, in proportion as he was eloquent, they were unfeeling, in proportion as he ſuffered, they enjoyed; and, when the agonizing groans of expiring innocence, demanded a ſuſpenſion at leaſt, of ill-founded indignation (and which in a humane crowd, would have produced the ſympathizing murmurs of pity and compaſſion) from theſe rational blood hounds, they drew forth the helliſh ejaculations of murderous enjoyment. But this was not all—When tender nature, ſtronger than his ſufferings, had, in the eloquence of injured innocence, recommended to human charity a helpleſs wife and unprotected infants, the infectious yells of unglutted cruelty, horribly announced the envenomed gangrene of their ſouls: the ſacrifice of thoſe he held dear was wanting to atchieve the honors of this immortal day: ſuch an effuſion of innocent blood had been too much for their hungry appetites, their overloaded ſenſes had ſunk beneath the weight of ſuch inſupportable enjoyment. Women too, not forgetting, but deſpiſing the peculiar weakneſs of their nature,

nature, were the gay ſpectators, the buſy actors in this heart-rending, diſguſting ſpectacle. The almoſt famiſhed workman too, this day ſtole from his labors to enjoy the gladdening influence of this ſprightly ſcene, and by it, thought himſelf more than compenſated, for the preſſing miſeries of ſuffering indigence. The current ſpecie of the kingdom, that had ſeemed buried in the bowels of the earth, was here drawn forth with all the giddy profuſion of riotous extravagance. Seats (for nothing was to be neglected that could give dignity to the ſpectacle, and convenience to the ſpectators) were bought by bankrupt poverty, with more eagerneſs, than they had been ever ſold to ſplendid opulence, at an imperial coronation. But what could be expected from a people, who in the true ſpirit of their diſtinguiſhed leaders, the National Aſſembly, meaſure patriotiſm by want of feeling!

Such was this day (I wiſh I could blot it out from the annals of the world), in which the tender paſſions, that ſo eminently form the glory and the happineſs of mankind, were reckoned a diſqualification and diſgrace, to a true and animated patriotiſm. Such was this——have I forgot that I am writing Engliſh? Have I forgot that Engliſhmen will not believe what they cannot conceive; and, though in religion they

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give credit to what is above their reaſon (and it is virtue to do ſo), yet in matters of this nature, their incredulity does honor to their humanity? I unfortunately cannot avail myſelf of this conſoling reſource. I was the unwilling ſpectator of ſome, the diſguſted auditor of all the tranſactions of this infamous day. I ſhould thank Providence, if then, I could have diſpenſed with the cruel evidence of my ſenſes, or now, with the unweakened impreſſions of my memory. One ſingle drop of innocent blood ſhed under the circumſtances I have mentioned, were ſufficient to ſtain even ſtains, to infamize even infamy, to blacken even blackneſs itſelf: no length of time, nor accumulated acts of public pity and benevolence, can ever efface it from the ſpot on which it has fallen. In the tranſports of rage and fury, men may commit actions at which human nature muſt ſhudder: paſſion is their cauſe, and paſſion is their palliation. But when murder is the effect of time and contrivance, cruelty the offspring of coolneſs, and inhumanity the reſult of reflection; the authors of ſuch can never be proper ſubjects for panegyric, and applauſe; but muſt be the objects of horror and indignation.

Since this gentleman, then, has not ſhewn any reaſonable grounds for praiſe, I think I am

juſtified in ſuppoſing he has not been able to ſhew any. I have attempted to prove through the courſe of this book, that the National Aſſembly and the French nation have merited cenſure. For this purpoſe I have ſelected facts that are, I believe, well known, and of which I have been a witneſs: from thoſe facts I have attempted to reaſon. If my arguments be neither convincing, nor ſatisfactory, I have only to lament the time I have ſpent, without either honor to myſelf or benefit to my readers.

Dr. Towers ſays, "That Mr. Burke's Reflec-
"tions on the Revolution in France, is a very
"ſplendid compoſition in point of language; he
"often diſplays a very luxuriant imagination,
"but he is extremely deficient in ſound rea-
"ſoning." This I take to be a very treacherous compliment indeed. For my own part I declare I have never read any book whatſoever more ſatisfactory in point of argument to my poor judgment, than Mr. Burke's Reflections on the Revolution in France. But who is this gentleman that aſſerts that Mr. Burke is deficient in ſound reaſoning? A man who has himſelf diſplayed either the moſt conſummate incapacity, or inſulting neglect of reaſoning I have ever ſeen. I defy any man to ſhew me one ſentence in this gentleman's book that can be called proof.

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When men will make hardy attacks on the reaſoning of others, and at the ſame time expect that mankind will believe them on their ſingle authority; they muſt themſelves ſhew inconteſtibly ſuch powers, as may induce men to think them not unfit ſubjects for the *argumentum adverecundiam.*

This gentleman, after condemning the conduct of our anceſtors at the Revolution, tells us that "When he joins with others in commemo-"rating the Revolution he does not do it as com-"memorating a tranſaction by which the people "have obtained all they have a right to claim." Thus we ſee thoſe muddy philoſophers knocking their heads together. I have always thought the point at iſſue between thoſe gentlemen and Mr. Burke was—rights acquired by the Revolution. They are it ſeems beaten out of this ground, and they now hold the doctrine of rights to be claimed in ſpite of the Revolution. Let us however follow them to their newly-acquired ground, and examine its ſolidity. What do they mean by the Revolution? They muſt certainly mean the conſtitution as ſettled at the Revolution; for in no other ſenſe can it be taken at this day; ſince a revolution can be beneficial or prejudicial to poſterity, only by its effects, and not by itſelf: but its principal effect is the conſtitution ariſing from it. Now the conſtitu-

tion we enjoy at this day, is precisely the constitution, as settled at the Revolution, therefore any right to be claimed in spite of the Revolution must be claimed in spite of the constitution.

The spirit of dangerous innovation that pervades the writings of these gentlemen, is happily corrected by the mental clumsiness with which it is urged. There are doctrines also, whose simple utterance is their best refutation. These Revolution amateurs are become so habituated to their favourite subject, and so pleased with it, that they have transferred this familiarity to their style, and revolutions are reckoned nothing more than transactions, happening in the ordinary course of human events. Revolutions are, I dare say, in the minds of these gentlemen, admirably calculated to correct faults in government.

The following paragraph from this gentleman's book, I beg leave to cite as being worthy of some observation. "Before William and Mary "were raised to the throne, it was debated in "both Houses, whether there was not an ori- "ginal contract between King and people, and "in both Houses it was resolved in the affirma- "tive. By both Houses, it was resolved, that "King James had broken the original contract, "and upon these votes was founded the final

"resolution

"resolution that the Throne was become vacant.
"In the Bill of Rights the acts of misconduct and
"tyranny of James the Second were particularly
"stated, and the whole of the proceedings taken
"together, amounted to a full and explicit de-
"claration that a King of England might, con-
"stitutionally, be dethroned for tyranny, or in
"other words, for a violation of the contract
"between him and the people.—And if the Par-
"liament of England justly claimed and exer-
"cised a right of dethroning a King for tyranny,
"and of appointing whom they pleased to suc-
"ceed him, there can be no doubt, but they
"have an equal right to make such alterations
"in their administration, or modes of govern-
"ment, as they shall judge the most advanta-
"geous to the community." This gentleman has, we find, taken great pains to prove the existence of an original contract between King and people. I confess, I thought it had never been denied. In a former part of this book, I have shewn where Mr. Burke expressly mentions it. The first part of this paragraph, then, that proves what has never been disputed, is, I conceive, nugatory. The latter part, that affects, that because the Parliament exercised the right of dethroning a King for a breach of the compact, they have a right to change the constitution

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of this country, is worthy of peculiar notice. I will venture to ſay there is not a boy at Eton or Weſtminſter, of common capacity and diligence, that would not bluſh, if detected in ſuch a palpable breach of one of the moſt obvious rules of common logic. "*Argumentum a particulari ad univerſali non valit.*" This is the gentleman forſooth who modeſtly aſſerts that Mr. Burke is deficient in ſound reaſoning. The moſt depraved paſſion of the human mind has never been indulged, at a more evident loſs of character, health, and fortune, than this ſpirit of Revolution, at the expence of law, conſtitution, common reaſon, and common ſenſe. *Stultus et improbus hic amor eſt dignuſque notari.*

The manner in which this gentleman endeavours to ſhift the doctrines of the Revolution Society, on the people of England, rouſes, I confeſs, my warmeſt indignation. Mr. Burke ſays, "the preſent King holds his Crown in contempt of the Revolution Society; but I hope "that he does not hold it in contempt of the "people of England, and of their choice and "approbation." This is ſuch an infamous appeal to the people's power, and not to the people's rights, as precludes the poſſibility of holding any terms with its author. The opinion I had formed of his underſtanding, yeilds not

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in the leaſt to what I now conceive of his principles. It is however matter of conſolation, that there are men who diſcover awkwardneſs in malignity, the inclination for miſchief, without the talent for contrivance. " I hope he does not " hold it in contempt of the people of England, " and of their choice and approbation." This is the language of a ſpecious, but profligate attorney, that would appear to reconcile the parties, at the moment he is provoking a rupture, by an inſidious explanation.

The preſent King of England holds his crown I truſt, with the unanimous approbation of his ſubjects; but he does not, I aſſert it, owe it to their choice. The Prince of Wales, if he lives, will come to the throne of this kingdom; and (though his virtues and his talents might be put, and not ſuffer in the competition, with thoſe of any other man) he will nevertheleſs be King of this country, on the ſingle ground of hereditary right. If there be faith in appearances, he will govern with honor to himſelf, and benefit to his people; and no efforts of Revolution induſtry will, I truſt, be able to convert his crown into a crown of thorns, or transform into rude and intractable ſavages an enlightened and reſpectful people.

Had this gentleman been the mild apologiſt,

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and not the ſtubborn vindicator of the Revolution Society, he had fulfilled a duty, much more conſiſtent with private charity, and public principle. Had he appealed to the pity, inſtead of provoking the reſentment of mankind, he and the Revolution Society might have been forgotten for ever. But when, on the contrary, he wiſhes to give importance to what it were charity to think nugatory, perpetuity to what never ſhould have exiſted, he muſt expect no terms from an Engliſhman, on principle attached to his Sovereign, and proud of the conſtitution under which he lives. When not ſatisfied with giving printed approbation to doctrines that are ſo reprobated, and whoſe authors have been ſo glorioufly chaſtiſed, he conjectures, with no ſmall degree of confidence, that the ſentiments of the Revolution Society are the ſentiments of the people of England, he muſt expect to meet the puniſhment ſuch unwarrantable preſumption deſerves. It is political perjury, to make a whole nation accomplices in guilt.—I have done with this gentleman.

The next pamphlet that preſents itſelf to my obſervation is, "Remarks on the Letter of the "Right Honorable Edmund Burke concerning "the Revolution in France, and on the Proceed-

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"ings in certain Societies in London, relative "to that Event, by Capel Loft, Eſq." On this gentleman's publication I have nothing to remark, I ſee little room for praiſe, and leſs for cenſure. In all the eſſential points of the French Revolution, he agrees with Mr. Burke. —As to the doctrine of "electing governors "and caſhiering them for miſconduct," this gentleman ſeems to lean entirely on the two Revolution Doctors, Price and Towers. He ſeems to give implicit faith to their reaſoning on the ſubject. I ſee nothing in his pamphlet that can be called a new idea on the ſubject. This gentleman, then, will have the goodneſs to ſuppoſe himſelf anſwered.

I have now to make a few obſervations on a pamphlet, entitled "Thoughts on Govern-"ment, occaſioned by Mr. Burke's Reflections "on the Revolution in France, in a Letter to a "Friend." This gentleman poſitively aſſerts that the ſacrifice of the two orders, of nobility and clergy, was abſolutely neceſſary to the ſafety of the National Aſſembly, and to that of the people they repreſent: for this reaſon, that little ſecurity was to be expected from men, who had ſolemnly relinquiſhed all odious claims, while much was to be dreaded from the paſt habits of their lives. This is the ſhort-ſighted

reaſoning of pitiful cowardice, that would aſſaſſinate a diſarmed enemy, to preclude the poſſibility of a ſecond attack. If, by the habits of their lives, this gentleman means a diſgraceful breach of their promiſe, an abject ſubmiſſion in the moment of danger, in order to ſecure the means of oppreſſion in the hour of ſafety; I contend for it, his aſſertion is falſe. I defy his moſt miſchievous induſtry to cite me one paſſage from hiſtory, that can juſtify ſuch a meaning. If he does not apply the words in the above ſenſe, his reaſoning is as ridiculous, as his poſition is inhuman.

This gentleman is, I truſt, the only Engliſhman that approves the decree for the abolition of hereditary nobility. He has, however, contented himſelf with the ſimple expreſſion of his approbation, he has not condeſcended to ſhew any grounds on which it may be beneficial to the community. Beſides, that this act was ſuch an exerciſe of unwarrantable power (the great ingredient in the reaſoning of theſe gentlemen) ſuch a mercileſs and unneceſſary degradation of an already degraded order of the ſtate; it involved in its effects, the inevitable ruin of many thouſands of induſtrious and reſpectable citizens. This act was abſolutely nothing leſs than the death-warrant of ſeveral branches of trade.

Herald

Herald painters, lace makers, engravers, &c. were ſacrificed when the hereditary nobility was aboliſhed: they were from this day precluded, by an act of the legiſlature, from exerciſing the only means by which they could honorably live.

This gentleman ſays the French have fitted out a ſtrong naval armament with vigor and diſpatch—this is not a matter of reaſoning, but of fact. To his aſſertion I oppoſe another. I ſay they have not fitted out a ſtrong naval armament with vigor and diſpatch. I am inclined to think myſelf at leaſt as well informed as this gentleman on the ſubject. It became almoſt proverbial to ſay that the National Aſſembly had admirable dexterity in fitting out fleets on paper. It were little neceſſary to take notice of matters of this nature, were it not to ſhew the modeſty of ſome men, who would deſtroy, by ſecond-hand information, the accurate obſervation and uniform experience of mankind.

This gentleman ſeems to think, "that France "may exhibit a third example to mankind at "how ſmall a charge every object of good "government may be obtained. To admi-"niſter juſtice, and to protect the country from "foreign enemies, are objects which muſt

" command the unanimous concurrence of all." As long as the National Aſſembly act upon the principles they have adopted; as long as they are led by ſuch men as Mirabeau, the Lameths, Barnave, &c. and as long as the people coincide in their meaſures, I deny either an univerſal or a general concluſion. With reſpect to this country, although I am well perſuaded that to adminiſter juſtice, and to protect the country from foreign enemies, will meet with a general, yet it will not meet with an unanimous concurrence, as long as their exiſts a ſet of men, whoſe ſeditious doctrines nor chaſtiſement can ſilence, nor ſhame repreſs.

This gentleman aſſerts, " that Mr. Burke's " doctrine reſts on the baſeleſs ſupport of pre- " judice, conceived in ignorance and error;" and prejudice he defines to be " caprice, and " the faſhions of a day." I ſhould be glad to aſk any man, that reaſons and wiſhes well, which ſpecies of government ſeems more founded in prejudice, as thus defined by this gentleman, that in which the ſucceſſion to the crown is fixed on the baſis of hereditary right, and where the forfeiture of the executive power is ſo clearly and indiſputably aſcertained by the commiſſion of certain acts, that are a breach of the contract; or that in which the people have, the right

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"to chooſe their own governors, and caſhier "them for miſconduct." The firſt in my humble conception, involves in it nothing like the idea of faſhion or caprice; nay more, it is perhaps the very ſtrongeſt inſtance that can be adduced to the contrary; for many laws exiſt that will admit of ſome deviation from their letter, in order to preſerve their ſpirit; but in this, of ſucceſſion to the crown, on the ſingle ground of hereditary right, the ſlighteſt deviation from the letter, either in the conſtruction or the execution, totally deſtroys its eſſence; whereas the ſecond naturally and neceſſarily carries with it an idea of caprice; for the very art of chooſing is more or leſs connected with caprice, and there muſt inevitably be great room for the fluctuating paſſions of mankind, in ſettling the portion of miſconduct, that would juſtify the exerciſe of this right, of caſhiering governors for miſconduct.

This gentleman endeavors to prove, by a kind of ſyllogiſm, that his preſent Majeſty owes his crown to the choice of his people; the Princeſs Sophia, ſays he, owed her right to the crown to the choice of the people; his Majeſty is the deſcendant of the Princeſs Sophia, therefore his Majeſty owes his crown to the choice of his people. This at beſt is a falſe ſyllogiſm, for there are four

terms

terms; but giving this gentleman ſome credit for a wretched attempt, at leaſt, at an argument (for theſe gentlemen in general attempt not to reaſon at all), let us ſee what he would be at. If he means that the right of the crown was originally owing to the choice of people, I agree with him; and could, I think, have made a better ſyllogiſm to prove it. If he does not, he muſt take the trouble of providing his readers with more ſatisfactory proof. In caſe however he ſhould have conſidered the right to the crown in the firſt meaning I have given, I think it not improper to remind him, that the expreſſion which he ſo much approves, "that the King of England is the only "lawful monarch, becauſe the only one that "owes his crown to the choice of his people," is manifeſtly abſurd; ſince on this very ground of *original choice*, all other monarchs are as lawful as the King of England; it being allowed on all hands, that in all governments, and in all countries, there was originally ſome choice of the people.

This gentleman ſeems to conceive great hopes, from the novelty of the French government; which, he ſays, "comes not recom-"mended by the experience of any nation, in "ancient or modern times." I doubt much, whether

whether any hopes from a government of which there is no precedent exiſting, can be well founded. For my own part, were I a legiſlator, I ſhould undoubtedly place more confidence in the long and approved experience of mankind, than in, at beſt, the hazardous reſource of untried experiment. There are philoſophers that, in their airy ſpeculations, fritter away the ſubſtance of good government, and of courſe the happineſs of mankind. From the little that is formed of the French conſtitution, it appears entirely novel, and evidently unrecommended by the experience of ancient or modern times. *

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* I believe the Revolution in France is the only one that has happened in the world, in which the fiſhwomen have taken a very leading part. They alſo have much influence at the Jacobins, who certainly are the governors of the country, and of courſe, in a great meaſure, the authors of the conſtitution. It may not be unworthy of remark, that in the very country that furniſhes ſuch a copious ſubject of panegyric to the Revolution Society, on the acquiſition of an enlightened liberty, there are the moſt violent outrages committed on the taſte, the feelings, and the ordinary habits of life. I have myſelf ſeen, on the Boulevards of Paris, a woman of faſhion, youth, and beauty, forced to the unwholeſome embrace of one of theſe female legiſlators. It is well known that no trifling ſums have been given to theſe ladies of the Halle, to purchaſe an exemption from their amorous frolics. The ladies of our fiſh-

This gentleman confeſſes himſelf incapable of diſcovering any difference, between Mr. Burke's doctrine, and that of divine, hereditary, indefeaſible right.

fiſhmarket here, are, I believe, without any diſparagement to this ſober, gentle, decent, orderly part of the community, the laſt objects that could provoke the embrace of a man of taſte or faſhion: they are, however, much ſuperior to their amiable ſiſters at Paris. I cannot help mentioning here an anecdote of theſe ladies, of which I was an eye-witneſs. In the month of July laſt, being at dinner with ſome gentlemen, our ears were aſſailed with ſome of the moſt horrid execrations I had ever heard (this it ſeems was owing to the very ungallant reſiſtance on the part of the ſervants); immediately after, in ruſhed theſe poliſhed Amazons, who amply redeem their total inability of appealing to the feelings, by the irreſiſtible effects their preſence produces on the ſenſes; one of the moſt glaring of which was, on our part, ſudden and total loſs of appetite. Nothing was left undone by theſe accompliſhed damſels, that could diſplay their talents. To pleaſe the ſight, they danced; to pleaſe the ear, they ſung; and the laſt, though not the leaſt of their powers, was given with ſuch exquiſite feeling, that I am really at a loſs to give it a determinate name. I know at the time we called it ſtrangling: I remember the ladies called it embracing. This friendly intruſion had not been ſafely rewarded with a ſmaller ſum than twelve livres—half a guinea.—I know not what a nobleman of this country would ſay, if a band of fiſhwomen ſhould force themſelves, in ſpite of the ſervants, into his dining-room, where he had company at dinner—he might call it liberty—I think it a very unpardonable one.

It

It is I believe the buſineſs of judgment, to diſcriminate between ideas that have ſome reſemblance; and this faculty of the mind is poſſeſſed by moſt men, in a greater or leſs degree. But he who cannot ſee the difference between ideas, that have no reſemblance at all, would acquire to himſelf but little benefit by reading, and convey, if poſſible, leſs to his readers by writing. I ſhall however endeavor to put Mr. Burke's ſentiments in ſo homely a manner, as may beſt ſuit this gentleman's underſtanding. Mr. Burke allows, that in all governments, there was originally ſome choice. In a divine hereditary indefeaſible right, there can be none. Mr. Burke expreſsly ſays, that there is a contract between King and people: in a *jure divino* government, there can be none. Mr. Burke ſays, that a King may be dethroned for a breach of the contract: a Monarch, *jure divino*, can only be dethroned by God. Mr. Burke aſſerts, that the hereditary right to the Crown is founded on the conſtitution: a divine hereditary indefeaſible right, is founded only on the will of God. Should this gentleman continue in his incapacity, I truſt he will be diſcreet enough not to declare it.

This gentleman denies the exiſtence of an irrevocable contract, "becauſe no legiſlature can "preſcribe a rule of conduct, which the ſame

" authority cannot afterwards annul." He does not I ſuppoſe deny the exiſtence of a compact, ſince it is univerſally allowed: he only means, of courſe, that ſuch a compact is not irrevocable—I agree with him—the King, Lords and Commons in Parliament aſſembled, can change the ſucceſſion to the Crown, and do any thing elſe that is not impoſſible, and in this ſenſe the compact cannot be ſaid to be irrevocable; but this ſo far from proving his poſition, " that the people can elect their govern-" ors," proves the contrary; becauſe the aſſent of the governors is eſſentially neceſſary to the revocation of the contract. To prove his poſition, the people alone muſt have the right of revocation.

This gentleman ſays, " that the whole fal-" lacy of Mr. Burke's reaſoning, conſiſts in " confounding the rights of the people with its " abuſe." If right be (and as contradiſtinguiſhed to power it muſt) nothing more than a moral competence, founded on the ſteady principles of truth, juſtice, good policy, &c. the exerciſe of this competence, and of nothing more, cannot be an abuſe: but the exerciſe of an abſtract power, and of nothing more, may be an abuſe; therefore I am inclined to think, that the fallacy of this gentleman's reaſoning, conſiſts in confounding the right with the power.

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He endeavours to illuſtrate his poſition by an inſtance. I think he ſtumbles on an unfortunate one. "In the exerciſe even of the clear-"eſt rights of property, man as a moral agent, "is bound by moral obligations. The ſacri-"fice which under this ſanction, he makes of "perſonal enjoyment to the duties of a father, "of a huſband, of a maſter, &c. does not im-"peach his dominion over his own property." This is in my mind one of the moſt evident examples that can be adduced, to ſhew what I have juſt ſaid, that the power and the right are confounded. I ſhall go no farther than his own words. He ſays, that in the expenditure or diſpoſal of property, man is bound by certain moral obligations; that is, man has no right to diſpoſe of his property, independent of theſe moral obligations. He alſo ſays, theſe moral obligations do not impeach a man's dominion over his property: that is, that a man has a right to do with his property as he pleaſes. Thus we find this able lawyer, ſaying in the ſame ſentence, that men have the right and have it not.—This dominion, then, that a man has over his property, that cannot be impeached nor reſtrained by the moral duties, is not the right, but the power. I contend for it, that no man has the right to diſpoſe of one guinea of his property, in a manner that may be prejudicial

to himſelf or the community: he may throw a thouſand guineas into the ſea, while ten thouſand objects, famiſhed with hunger, and ſhivering with cold are ſurrounding him; but no one will, I truſt, be hardy enough to ſay, that he had the right ſo to do, although he moſt inconteſtably had the power.

Before I conclude my remarks on this pamphlet, I muſt take notice of an expreſſion, which is, I humbly conceive, little conſiſtent with the principles of a Chriſtian, or the manners of a gentleman. "Mr. Burke thinks there "muſt be blood! I will not ſay Edmund, thy "wiſh is father to the thought." How a wiſh can be father to a thought, I am, I confeſs, unable to conceive. It is not difficult to ſuppoſe a thought's being father to a wiſh. Giving this gentleman, however, credit for his malevolence, I ſhall ſay, that this ſo unprovoked intimation againſt the feelings of an honeſt and a good man, diſplays a fertility for calumny, not eaſily to be equalled indeed. But is this ſurprizing in men that are notorious libellers on law, on conſtitution? in men who expect much from novelty—in men who ſeem to deſpiſe governments, that come recommended by the collected wiſdom and integrity of ages. It is not difficult to conceive the motives of their reaſoning. The old, the venerable

venerable, the ſteady principles of good government, furniſh but ſmall reſources to meddling folly, or ſtupid ambition. Novelty is deſirable, becauſe novelty may create confuſion. One word more of this gentleman and I diſmiſs him for ever. There ſeems to be in his ſtyle a conſequential humility, that would *beg* for *praiſe*, at the moment it is *extorting contempt*.

I am now to make a few remarks on a pamphlet, entitled, "Obſervations on the Reflec-"tions of the Right Honorable Edmund "Burke, on the Revolution of France, in a "Letter to the Right Honorable the Earl of "Stanhope." This pamphlet is, it ſeems, the production of a lady, well known in the literary world. She ſets out with telling his Lordſhip, that "her obſervations are not directed to *captivate*; "but to *convince*." For my own part, I have been ever taught to believe, that to *captivate* was the peculiar province of the ſex, and that its appeals to the *heart* were *always* ſucceſsful; whatever might have been the fate of its efforts to *convince* the underſtanding. This lady, however, ſeems to pique herſelf leſs in thoſe delicate touches of female ſenſibility, that are ſo well calculated to perſuade, even a ſtubborn mind, than in the *maſterly ſtrokes of vigorous conception*, which

which, if unable to convey *laſting* conviction, give at leaſt temporary ſatisfaction. " It is not " ſurprizing," this lady ſays, " that the French " Revolution ſhould have engaged the paſſions " of all reflecting men." I proteſt I cannot well reconcile this with the former paſſage, where this lady would totally exclude the *paſſions*, and ſolely appeal to the reaſon. There is ſomething *in engaging the paſſions of reflecting men*, that I cannot eaſily apply to this lady's favorite principle. Although ſhe ſeems to diſdain the mortifying characteriſtic of her ſex (the power of captivating), and ſcorns any *direct* appeal to the paſſions, ſhe may have ſtruck out a new line in the human taſte, and have no objection to *paſſion* upon *reflection*.

This lady ſays, " that Mr. Burke's apprehen- " ſions are no ways conſiſtent with the *high* opi- " nion he has formed of the Engliſh conſtitution, " and of the attachment which he ſuppoſes all " that is great and good in the nation have to " it." This is founded on the principle, that there can be no reaſonable apprehenſions for any thing that ſtands high in opinion, particularly if it be fortified by ſtrong attachments. I am ſorry to be forced to differ from this lady. I humbly conceive that the more perfect any thing may be, the ſtronger and better grounded are

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our apprehenſions for its ſafety; becauſe we are the more intereſted in its preſervation. To elucidate this by an example—Let us ſuppoſe two women, one with a beautiful, the other with an ordinary face; and let us then ſee, which of thoſe two ladies will have the greater anxiety for the preſervation of what is beautiful, or what is the reverſe. The queſtion demands but little conſideration to be inſtantly decided. As to *attachments*, I have only to obſerve, that there is nothing under heaven ſo variable as *attachments*, and nothing half ſo variable as *ſtrong attachments*. This lady's experience may poſſibly belie my obſervation; and indeed from her eagerneſs to *convince*, and not to *captivate*, one may well ſuppoſe that on the ſubject of *attachments* ſhe has no reaſon to complain at all.

This lady runs through no ſmall portion of hiſtory; for what purpoſe I declare I cannot ſee. She concludes this part of her obſervations, by ſaying that "our anceſtors had no right to bind "poſterity, to all ſucceeding generations, in "the permanent chains, of an unalterable "law." She is certainly very amiable; for without the ſmalleſt ſolicitation, ſhe gives up the point at iſſue between Mr. Burke and his opponents. Since ſhe ſays that our anceſtors at the Revolution had no right to bind poſterity,

by

by an unalterable law, ſhe of courſe allows, that there was a law made by our anceſtors, which they conſidered as binding; for it is abſurd to ſay, they had no right to do, what they never attempted to do. Now the point in queſtion is "Rights acquired to us by the Revolution." The point then on this lady's confeſſion ſtands ſimply thus—that there is a law; but that the law is not *unalterable*. I agree with her; for there certainly is no law that a former legiſlature has made, that a ſubſequent one may not alter and annul. But it is the *legiſlature only* that can alter, that is, King, Lords, and Commons together, and not the people or their repreſentatives, with the Lords, independently of the *King*.

This Lady's forte, is, I believe, hiſtory. She may be alſo an excellent judge of the *conſtitution*, her opinions on it, I make no doubt, are much reſpected. There is not, I preſume, a lady of her acquaintance, that has not implicit faith in her *judgment*, and that would not wiſh to be directed by her *experience*.

The following paſſage I have taken the liberty of tranſcribing from this lady's performance. "The two clubs which have the *misfortune* to "fall under Mr. Burke's ſevere cenſure, did "not teſtify a formal approbation of the con-

"duct

" duct of their neighbours, till the deputies
" they had choſen for the tranſaction of their
" affairs had manifeſted a virtue equal to ſo high
" a truſt; for no ſooner was the power of the
" Court ſufficiently ſubdued to enable them to
" act with freedom and effect, than they gave
" an example of diſintereſted magnanimity, that
" has no parallel in the conduct of any preced-
" ing aſſembly, and which was never ſurpaſſed
" by any individual. That memorable day in
" which the Members of the National Aſſembly,
" with a virtuous enthuſiaſm, vied with each
" other in the alacrity, with which they ſurren-
" dered to the people all their *feudal privileges*,
" will for ever ſtand in the records of time as
" a monument of their ſingular greatneſs. Such
" an inſtance of human virtue was ſurely a pro-
" per ſubject of applauſe and congratulation."
This lady is ſingularly complaiſant; ſhe grants every thing without being aſked, nay more, even in her reſiſtance is to be found the ſpirit of compliance. Her cenſure on Mr. Burke is ultimately his panegyric, as her praiſes of the National Aſſembly are, in fact, the moſt bitter invectives againſt it. The ſurrender of the feudal privileges, which this lady conſiders as reflecting everlaſting honor on the National Aſſembly, I look on as one of the ſources of its

irredeemable disgrace. The nobles and upper clergy, to whom *alone* those privileges were attached, with *disinterested magnanimity* (to use this lady's expression) surrendered them: they went farther, they were willing to surrender all odious claims. Was it then well done in the National Assembly to strip them of what were not odious? Was it well done to rob one order, and to degrade the other? Was it well done to plunder willing generosity, and degrade self-humbled dignity? Was it well done to deprive the nobles of their harmless honors and their equally harmless titles? Should this lady answer this last question in the affirmative, she will at least preserve her consistency, she will differ from the generality of her sex. However manfully the *men* may have borne such a derogation from their dignity, I can assure her, the *ladies* were deeply affected indeed. A Duke transformed into simple Monsieur is tolerable, but a Dutchess into plain Madame is insupportable, is shocking to the last degree.

This lady speaks "of the successful storm-"ing of the King's camp." I am really at a loss to know, to what this lady particularly alludes. I cannot well conceive the "storming of a "camp" without a shot being fired, or a single man either killed or wounded. This lady has

has ſurely had very bad information. I can venture to aſſure her, that from the opening of the States General to this moment, no camp whatſoever has been taken, either by ſurprize or by ſtorm. This lady's defence of the lamp poſt is one of the moſt ingenious things I have read. "To a people accuſtomed to ſee their "fellow-creatures broken on the wheel, the "lamp poſt appeared a mild puniſhment." In ſhort, ſimple hanging in France is quite amuſing, and admirably calculated to relieve the oppreſſed nerves of the ſpectators. The ſufferers muſt, no doubt, have been quite delighted at this happy invention, conceived by an *enlightened*, and reduced to practice by a *merciful* people.

This lady conſiders "the boaſted birth-right "of an Engliſhman as an arrogant pretenſion, "built on a beggarly foundation. It is an ar-"rogant pretenſion, becauſe it intimates a kind "of excluſion to the reſt of mankind from the "ſame privileges; and it is beggarly, becauſe it "reſts our legitimate freedom on the *alms* of our "princes." I am forced to differ from this lady on both theſe points. Firſt, I do not think our boaſted birth-right arrogant, for the direct contrary reaſon ſhe gives; becauſe when any ſtranger ſets his foot on Engliſh ground, that moment he is free, however ſlave he might

have been before. If the governments of other countries will not follow our example, we are ſurely not to blame. Secondly, as to "beggarly foundation," I diſagree from her, and for the direct contrary reaſon alſo; becauſe all the acceſſions of freedom acquired by the people, in the unſettled ſtate of our conſtitution, were extorted, and not given. This lady is not aware of her own inconſiſtency. Page 31, ſhe ſays, "that in either caſe" of extortion or donation "our freedom ſtands on a reſumable right"—If then our boaſted birth-right be nothing more than alms (alms being the moſt voluntary of all donations) the freedom we enjoy at this day, which is nothing more nor leſs than our boaſted birth-right, ſtands, according to this lady's mode of reaſoning, on a reſumable right. Thus would ſhe publiſh herſelf as the vindicator of the people's rights, at the very moment ſhe is declaring all their rights reſumable; all their rights being, in her opinion, donations, and all donations being reſumable. This ſtyle of writing is, I am afraid, little calculated either to *captivate* or *convince*.

Mr. Burke ſays, "that with us the King and "Lords are ſeveral and joint ſecurities, for the "equality of each diſtrict, each province, each "city." On this paſſage this lady makes the following

following comment: "If your Lordſhip ſees the "reſult of this argument in the ſame light as "I do, you will conſider it as equally recommen- "datory to an election of the Lower Houſe, "in the King and the Lords, as of an inade- "quate repreſentation made by the election of "the Commons. For if the King and the Lords "are ſeveral and joint ſecurities for the equality "of each diſtrict, each province, and each "city; why throw the country into a ſtate of "confuſion every ſeven years?" This lady has, it ſeems, totally miſconceived Mr. Burke's meaning, although I confeſs I can ſee no difficulty in the paſſage. The King and Lords are ſeveral and joint truſtees, that the whole be taken care of, and not ſome of the parts, excluſively of the reſt. Had the King or the Lords, or both, the right of electing the Lower Houſe, then the Lower Houſe, could not be ſaid to be the repreſentatives of the people, and in ſuch a caſe, the *whole* might be neglected; whereas on Mr. Burke's reaſoning it is manifeſt, that no *part* can be neglected, ſince the King and the Lords are, and muſt neceſſarily be jealous truſtees for the equality of *each* and *every* part.

This lady gives three pompous reaſons for depriving the church of its property. "This "property was a treble *nuiſance*. It was a "nuiſance

"nuiſance in the firſt inſtance, as a monopoly;
"in the ſecond, it was a nuiſance, as giving a
"dangerous power to thoſe that poſſeſſed that
"monopoly; and in the third inſtance, as
"it tended by the natural courſe of moral
"cauſes in this its exceſs, to corrupt rather than
"to increaſe and invigorate thoſe qualities of
"the mind, and thoſe ſpiritual endowments
"which are to be deſired in the teachers of re-
"ligion." This is a new ground, one I believe, unheard of in the records of reaſoning, for depriving any men, or bodies of men, of their property.

I muſt be ungallant enough to differ from this lady, on every one of thoſe points. Firſt, I think it no monopoly; becauſe any thing that was not originally intended to be common, and that ought not to be ſo, cannot be a monopoly. In fact there can be no ſuch thing as a monopoly of money, or of territorial property, the word being only applied to the means by which either the one or the other may be acquired. This lady might as well ſay, that the Duke of Bedford's or any other nobleman's property was a monopoly. Such a ſentiment would, I truſt, be but ill reliſhed by any Engliſhman whatſoever, that thinks, and ſpeaks as he thinks. Secondly, what this lady calls

monopoly

monopoly gave no more dangerous power to thoſe that poſſeſſed it, than to any other men or bodies of men that poſſeſſed any other property to as great amount. If, then, danger naturally attaches itſelf to the poſſeſſion of all large property, all ſuch properties ſhould be deſtroyed: *i. e.* that commerce and every other means of acquiring them ſhould be annihilated; for it is abſurd to ſay that any given portion of property is more dangerous in the hands of one ſet of poſſeſſors than in another. Any danger that may accrue from the poſſeſſion of property depends on the paſſions, and not on the ſituation of men. Thirdly, I muſt obſerve that, one expreſſion of this lady's, is to me unintelligible, perhaps from its ſublimity. I confeſs I know not what ſhe means by "the "courſe of moral cauſes in this its exceſs." But waving this, which, for aught I know, may be a very ſublime obſcurity, I deny that property "tends to corrupt the ſpiritual endowments." Among the ſpiritual endowments, the foremoſt ſurely are, truth, piety, and charity. I hope it does not follow, that property makes men liars. That would be to make men ſinners in the *inverſe ratio* of their temptations. I ſee no impiety that naturally attaches itſelf to the poſſeſſion of property: a rich man may ſurely be

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as pious as a poor man, and if he has profited by his riches, his piety will be probably more enlightened, he will, in fact, be more pious, becauſe he will be leſs ſuperſtitious. There can be no practical charity at leaſt, without the means; for however well a man may wiſh his neighbour, his wiſhes alone will neither clothe nor feed him.

This lady is very ſevere indeed on the French eccleſiaſtics; ſhe is nothing leſs than convinced of the impurity of their lives. "Becauſe their "temptations were great, and that their na- "ture was not ſuperior to human infirmity, "it was probable they produced their due ef- "fects." This lady is better than ſhe thinks ſhe is. I defy her to be ill-natured. She is really incapable of ſaying a ſevere thing. At the moment ſhe is accuſing the unfortunate clergy of France, ſhe is exculpating them. For ſince their *natures* were not ſuperior to human infirmity, they ſurely cannot be blamed for following the impulſe of their natures, and yielding to what this lady allows it was impoſſible to reſiſt.—This lady is, in ſpite of her obſtinate partiality for *conviction*, a woman ſtill. When ſhe writes another pamphlet, ſhe will, I am *convinced*, be leſs ſevere on the ill-treated churchmen of our neighbour country. She will re-

collect

collect that eccleſiaſtics are not *women*, and of courſe, unprofitable ſubjects for a *woman's* invective.

This Lady ſays, "that Mr. Burke is in a "rage, that the poor curates ſhould be taken out "of the hopeleſs poverty, into which they were "plunged." She is indeed either very inattentive, or much miſinformed as to French politics. The curates (or as they are called *curès*) are thoſe we call parſons, or rectors. Thoſe men, ſo far "from being taken from the hope-"leſs poverty into which they were plunged," are abſolutely poorer than ever. They have at preſent twelve hundred livres a year; about forty-ſix pounds: very, very few indeed had leſs than this: much the greater part had more. This is a fact well known, and that no man that is acquainted with France, or its internal police, can deny.

This lady ſeems, more than any other writer on the ſubject, to confound the *right* and the *power*. Moſt of the champions for the exerciſe of the power, admit of ſome qualifications in its exerciſe. This lady has, it ſeems, a peculiar fancy for an abſtract *naked* power.

I cannot think of taking my leave of this lady, without ſaying how much I admire her talents. Her ingenuity is obvious. Her ſtyle

is eaſy and elegant. I could wiſh ſhe had employed her numerous qualifications to a better purpoſe. When ſhe ſays, ſhe *will* convince, and is determined not to captivate, ſhe has miſtaken her forte. She has *captivated* me long ſince. I cannot, will not ſay, ſhe has *convinced* me. There is in the female character a certain *je ne ſais quoi*, that few men of any ſoul are able to reſiſt. It is the peculiar and enchanting privilege of the ſex, that their *weakneſs* is their *ſtrength*. 'Tis it, that makes our *ſtubborn* natures bend. If it be not the ſhield that defends, it is the arrow that mortally wounds. It is the ſource of peaceful victory: we yield to what we know we are unable to reſiſt. When this *natural* and *delightful* peculiarity, is ſuperſeded by an *affectation* of manlineſs, the female character loſes all its charms, it loſes all its luſtre: our former *vanquiſhers* become our *equals*.

Before I make any remarks on Dr. Prieſtley's various letters to Mr. Burke, I muſt beg leave to take notice of an expreſſion to be found in his Preface. He aſſerts "that Monſieur "Lally de Tollendal" (whoſe Memoir Mr. Burke cites) "had very different ideas from thoſe "of Mr. Burke." In order to prove this, Doctor Prieſtley confounds two very diſtinct epochs, of which Monſieur Lally de Tollendal ſpeaks

ſpeaks in very different terms. The firſt was, the opening of the States General, of which he ſays—that it was a great work, to concur in the regeneration of France, in founding liberty there, and in creating laws and manners. Mr. Burke has never differed from him on this point, having ſaid that the day on which the States met, was the moſt glorious the French nation had ever ſeen; and how could it have been glorious, but for the purpoſes mentioned by Monſieur Lally de Tollendal. The ſecond epoch was, when Monſieur Lally de Tollendal and Monſieur de Mounier quitted the National Aſſembly, diſguſted, that their colleagues *would* not co-operate with them, in the regeneration of France, in founding liberty, and in creating laws and manners there. It is becauſe the National Aſſembly has overthrown all liberty, all law, and all manners, that thoſe two men (the beſt and moſt enlightened members of the National Aſſembly) remain in voluntary exile, and are ſtill *diſguſted*.

In Dr. Prieſtley's firſt letter, he cites paſſages from Mr. Burke, and would infer from them the neceſſity of having *totally* deſtroyed the French government. Firſt, Mr. Burke ſays, "that in caſes of extreme emergency, "there is a power of change; but that the

" change ſhould be confined to the *peccant part* " only." Mr. Burke alſo ſays, " that the un- " limited power of the Sovereign over his ſub- " jects was inconſiſtent with law and liberty." From theſe two paſſages Dr. Prieſtley draws the following concluſion: " If *law* and *liberty* " were *wanting* in the old conſtitution of France, " the *peccant part* muſt have been the very foun- " dation of it; ſo that nothing effectual could " have been done, ſhort of taking down the " whole." To this I anſwer, that many things in a government may be " inconſiſtent with law " and liberty," and it does not follow that " law and liberty are wanting in the conſtitu- " tion." For inſtance—The impreſs of men for the ſea ſervice, and the exciſe laws, have been conſidered by the ableſt men as inconſiſtent with the principles of the Engliſh conſtitution; yet no one will ſay that law and liberty are wanting in the Engliſh conſtitution. If Dr. Prieſtley *will* affect the modeſt triumph, of having convicted Mr. Burke on his own aſſertions, let him make Mr. Burke's *terms*, and *no other*, the premiſes from which he is to draw concluſions; and let him not recur to the pitiful ſubterfuge, of ſubſtituting others in their place. Was it not as eaſy for Dr. Prieſtley to have made uſe of the words " inconſiſtent with law and liberty," as the

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other words "law and liberty *wanting* in the conſtitution?" But the misfortune of theſe gentlemen is, that by being candid, they are manifeſtly abſurd. Thus far I have acted on the defenſive. I, now, am willing to let Dr. Prieſtley's words ſtand in their full force, and I diſallow his reaſoning—"If law and liberty" ſays he, "were wanting in the old conſtitution, the "*peccant part* muſt have been the *very* founda-"tion of it." This I deny. I deny (to ſpeak logically in oppoſing a logician) that the conſequent neceſſarily follows from the antecedent, I challenge him to prove that it does. If *light* and *air* be wanting in an edifice, it follows not, that the peccant part is the foundation of it. If they be *totally* wanting, not only the foundation is *peccant*, but every other part is peccant alſo. The words "peccant part"—neceſſarily imply, that all the *other* parts are not peccant. If this ſingle *part* can be mended or reformed without deſtroying the reſt, it anſwers every end. In this ſenſe has Mr. Burke I humbly conceive taken it, and in no other.

Mr. Burke ſays, "that the National Aſſem-"bly have not the ſanction, and authority of "the character, under which they firſt met. "They have departed from the inſtructions of "the people, by whom they were ſent, which

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"instructions, as the Assembly did not act in "virtue of any ancient usage, or settled law, "were the sole source of their authority." This Dr. Priestley is obliged to allow, but denies the inference from it; "for," says he, "it "is the acquiescence of the people that gives "any form of government its proper sanction, "and that legalizes it." Dr. Priestley either does, or does not mean, that *all* the acts of the National Assembly must be lawful, if acquiesced in by the people. If he does not, then, any argument he can draw from acquiescence *alone* is nugatory. If he does, then, an act of this Assembly, that decred an equal partition of all the lands in the kingdom (which act would most assuredly have been acquiesced in by the people) had been lawful. Suppose the National Assembly had made an *ex post facto* law, and that the people had acquiesced in it; will Dr. Priestley say that acquiescence alone can legalize it? I believe not. I cannot entertain so poor an opinion of any man's principles. The possibility of the cases I have put exists, and their possibility alone destroys the *universality* of Dr. Priestley's conclusion. In my own mind their *probability* exists; for there is nothing that men can do, that I do not conceive the National Assembly capable of (I mean the majority

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that are led by Mirabeau), and nothing more probable, than that the people would aſſent to any thing they could do.

Mr. Burke, in my humble opinion, adduces the moſt incontrovertible reaſon to prove that the King ſhould have the power of peace and war. "There is no other way" he ſays "of "keeping other potentates from intriguing "diſtinctly and perſonally with the members of "your aſſembly, from intermeddling with all "your concerns, and fomenting in the very "heart of your country, the moſt pernicious of "all factions; factions in the intereſt, and under "the direction of a foreign power." This reaſoning, Dr. Prieſtley ſays, is ridiculous, "becauſe foreign powers may intrigue with "miniſters, as well as with the *leaders* of a popu-"lar aſſembly." This looks plauſible; but it is only plauſible, for this reaſon—that *reſponſibility* may be attached to miniſters, but it is impoſſible that it can ever be to the members of a popular aſſembly.

Dr. Prieſtley has, it ſeems, a mortal antipathy to ſtating Mr. Burke's ſentiments, according to their letter or their ſpirit. Of this I ſhall give a moſt ſtriking inſtance. Mr. Burke expreſſes his ſurpriſe "that a great number of the "members of the National Aſſembly, were of

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" the *inferior*, *unlearned*, *mechanical*, merely *in-*
" *ſtrumental* members, of the profeſſion of the
" law." The men alluded to in this deſcription, Dr. Prieſtley calls *lawyers*, and reaſons accordingly. " Lawyers," he ſays, " who have " the talent and habit of ſpeaking in public, " being conſpicuous characters in all places." Is there another man in England that would call the claſs of men thus deſcribed by Mr. Burke, *lawyers?* I proteſt, I cannot well conceive any man poſſeſſed of ordinary human powers, capable of ſuch egregious miſconception; for if it be not miſconception, it is want of candor. If Dr. Prieſtley underſtood Mr. Burke, he certainly is uncandid, becauſe it was impoſſible on, any other ground, to call that white, which is evidently black; for ſuch is the difference between the men Mr. Burke means, and thoſe we call *lawyers*. If he did not underſtand Mr. Burke (which by the bye, is the more charitable inference) I ſay he has ſhewn the moſt egregious want of common conception.

Dr. Prieſtley ridicules the idea of Mr. Burke's lamenting the ſituation of the King of France. In the minds of feeling men this ridicule is no proof of humanity. That ſituation is the moſt cruel, that moſt outrages the feelings and habits of life. In this ſituation is the King of France,

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and of courſe more *naturally* an object of compaſſion, than of ridicule. When this unfortunate man ſent, ſome time ſince, to the National Aſſembly a complaint of the atrocious libels that daily appeared againſt him and the Queen, at the ſame time begging their interference, they, without any farther ceremony, paſſed on to the order of the day. This circumſtance will furniſh Dr. Prieſtley with ample ground for ridicule, he will no doubt laugh heartily at it. There are men that will be very differently affected. "*Sunt lacrymæ rerum, et mentem mortalia tangunt.*"

I am now come to that part of Dr. Prieſtley's work, where he adopts and defends the doctrine of "electing our governors, and caſhiering "them for miſconduct." Dr. Prieſtley, as uſual, ſets out with miſrepreſentation. He ſays, "Mr. "Burke ſuppoſes that men by entering into a "ſtate of ſociety, give up *all* their proper "natural rights."—To eat, to drink, to ſleep, &c. are proper natural rights, and theſe Dr. Prieſtley is kind enough to ſay, that Mr. Burke ſuppoſes we part with, by entering into a ſtate of ſociety. It is preſumption not to be equalled, to coin abſurd ſentiments, and then ſtate them as the ſentiments of another. It is adding guilt to guilt, firſt to coin, and then accuſe one's

neighbour of it. But let us proceed.—"As to "the ſhare of authority," Mr. Burke ſays, "and direction which each individual ought to "have, in the management of the ſtate, that "I muſt deny, to be among the direct original "rights of man in civil ſociety."—This poſition Dr. Prieſtley would overturn thus. "Men "cannot ſurely be ſaid to give up their natural "rights by entering into a compact for the "better ſecuring of them: and if they make "a wiſe compact, they will never wholly "exclude themſelves from all ſhare in the admi-"niſtration of their government, or ſome con-"trol over it." As to the firſt of thoſe points, I ſay, that men *do* give up ſome of their natural rights, in order to ſecure the reſt. It is a *natural* right, for inſtance, to be the redreſſer of one's own wrongs; but this right is incompatible with a ſtate of ſociety. As to the ſecond point, I have to remark, that by the words, "ſhare "in the adminiſtration of the government," Dr. Prieſtley muſt mean either individually or not. If he does, he of courſe recommends a *pure* democracy, that being the only government in which the people have individually a ſhare in it; therefore his obſervation is inappoſite, having nothing to do with a right, "to elect "governors and to caſhier them for miſconduct,"

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in a government that is not a pure democracy. If he does not, then his remark is nugatory; becauſe the people of this country have, in their collective capacity, a great ſhare in the adminiſtration of the government.

Dr. Prieſtley aſſerts, in the moſt unqualified manner, that the King is the *ſervant* and not the *ſovereign* of his people. I ſhall endeavor to prove that he not only is not, but cannot be the ſervant of his people.—Obedience is the firſt of all qualifications in a ſervant, without it I defy any man to have a perfect idea of a ſervant. Right to obedience in the maſter, and right to protection and ſupport in the ſervant have been never diſputed.—Since, then, the conſtitution of this country has given the King an abſolute *veto*, whereby he has the right to *annul* the will of the people, which right precludes the right of obedience, being diametrically oppoſed to it, and ſince obedience is abſolutely neceſſary in a ſervant, the King is certainly not, nor can be the *ſervant* of his people. The manner in which the *veto* is expreſſed ſavors entirely of the *ſovereign*, and not in the ſlighteſt degree of the *ſervant*. "I *will*, that it be not ſo." As in aſſent, "I *will*, that it be ſo." How will Dr. Prieſtley reconcile this ſtyle, with the idea of a ſervant?

Dr. Prieſtley aſſerts "that the National "Aſſembly could not have been ſo ignorant "of the conſtitution of this country, as to "ſuppoſe, that the Revolution Society was a "body authorized by the ſtate, or that it had "any connexion with the government of the "country." This is, at beſt, with Dr. Prieſtley, or any other man, matter only of conjecture; for there has been no vote of that aſſembly, by which it appears they conſidered the Revolution Society as authorized by the ſtate, or not. For my own part, I declare, that I have known ſeveral members of the National Aſſembly, that when informed by me, that the Revolution Society was only a club, ſeemed aſtoniſhed and ſhocked to the laſt degree.

The 30th of January is, by Dr. Prieſtley, called "a *proud* day for England."—Royal misfortunes ſerve as pleaſant paſtimes, nothing leſs than royal blood, I ſuppoſe, can ſatisfy the hungry appetites of theſe political epicures. It is more than human preſumption to call that *proud*, which the whole world calls *infamous*. It is the corruption of the heart, to exult in what is ſhame, to rejoice in what is ſorrow. The 30th of January a *proud* day for England! The *martyrdom* of King Charles a proud day for England! Theſe *charitable* politicians would

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ſurely rejoice in the exemplification of their doctrines. They would no doubt be glad to write their impure pamphlets with the blood of kings. They will be diſappointed. Engliſhmen will not quietly permit that to be marked with white, which *they* have marked with black. They will not tamely ſuffer ſuch unwarrantable outrage upon their feelings. They will not liſten with patience to a title, that conſigns them to everlaſting infamy. They will not ſuffer any man to volunteer in their damnation. No. Inſtead of damning, they will ſtrive to redeem the national character: if they cannot totally efface, they will, at leaſt, diminiſh the ſtain that has ſo frightfully diſcolored it.

I am arrived at that part of Dr. Prieſtley's anſwer where he treats of religious matters. He begins by ſaying, "What right has any man to "complain of me, if I worſhip God in what "manner I pleaſe, or if I do not chuſe to wor-"ſhip God at all? Does my conduct, in this "reſpect, injure them?" To the firſt of thoſe queſtions, I anſwer, that Dr. Prieſtley, as a ſimple individual, may adopt what mode of worſhip he pleaſes, and probably no man will complain; becauſe his *private* ſentiments will probably intereſt no man; but were Dr. Prieſtley a member of the legiſlature, and after being

being ſo, publicly profeſſed himſelf a Papiſt, in ſuch a caſe the people would complain, and complain with effect too; any farther than this no one meddles with Dr. Prieſtley's or any other man's mode of faith. To the ſecond queſtion, "Does my conduct in this reſpect injure them?" I anſwer that it may: for this obvious reaſon; that in the minds of religious men, the idea of future rewards and puniſhments operates as a ſtrong inducement to virtue, and a powerful preventative of vice; whereas on a man of no religion, the law of God operates not at all: ſince then a man of no religion wants *one* of the inducements to virtue, and *one* of the preventatives of vice, he ſurely muſt be conſidered a leſs ſafe member of ſociety, than he that wants none.

Dr. Prieſtley treats an expreſſion made uſe of by Mr. Burke, as abſurd; "that man is, by his "conſtitution, a religious animal." "Becauſe," ſays he, "we may eaſily conceive a being, poſ-"ſeſſed of all the eſſential properties of human "nature, without any *knowledge* of religion at "all." So we can conceive a being poſſeſſed of all the eſſential qualities of human nature, without any *knowledge* of the properties of food; yet no one will ſay, that man is not an eating animal. It is not neceſſary to have a knowledge

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of religion, to be a religious animal; for the being who worſhips a bull, is as much a religious animal, as he, who more enlightened, worſhips an immaterial being, with all the qualities of omnipotence, omniſcience, ubiquity, &c. In no part of the world has there been found a people, who have not had ſome ſort of religion, however ridiculous ſuch religion may appear to us. Since, then, religion of ſome ſort or other, is not adventitious, but found among men, in a ſtate of nature, we muſt conclude that man is conſtitutionally a religious animal. I am well aware of the charge of inconſiſtency, that from what I have ſaid, *might* be brought againſt me; one *might* ſay, that ſince I have, in the foregoing paragraph, ſpoken of men of no religion, how comes in, that I think that man is conſtitutionally a religious animal? When I ſpeak of men of no religion, I mean thoſe whoſe ſentiments are corrupted, for I confeſs I cannot conceive that an Atheiſt exiſts. A man may take poiſon, and yet no man will deny that man is an eating animal. "Admitting, however," ſays Dr. Prieſtley, "that man is by conſtitution "a religious animal, government has no more "right to interfere, with reſpect to this conſti- "tutional property of man, than any other "conſtitutional eſſential property; for ex- "ample

"ample, man is conſtitutionally and neceſſarily "an eating and a ſleeping animal; but does "it therefore follow, that civil government "has any thing to do with his eating and ſleep-"ing?" To this I anſwer, that where govern-ment provides for the eating or ſleeping of men, it has a right to interfere. It has a right to preſcribe what ſuch men ſhall eat, what ſuch men ſhall drink, and where ſuch men ſhall ſleep. This we find to be the caſe in all inſtitutions under the direction of government. In matters of religion, government arrogates nothing extraordinary to itſelf. It does not preſcribe opinions to private individuals, unconnected with, and independent of it; but ſurely it has the right to inſiſt, that thoſe that belong to it, ſhall *profeſs* no other mode of faith, than that itſelf profeſſes: farther than this, it interferes not; and this I conceive, to be very reaſonable indeed. Private individuals have a right to chooſe their own ſervants, and many have an inſuperable objection to take thoſe that are of a different perſuaſion from themſelves.

"The Chriſtian ſtateſman," Mr. Burke ſays, "muſt firſt provide for the multitude, "becauſe it is the multitude, and is there-"fore, as ſuch, the firſt object in the Eccleſi-"aſtical inſtitution, and in all inſtitutions." Dr. Prieſtley ſays, "that for this reaſon the Ro-

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"man Catholic religion, ſhould be the eſta-
"bliſhed religion in Ireland, becauſe the mul-
"titude there are Roman Catholics." Now Dr. Prieſtley either does, or does not agree with Mr. Burke. If he does not, his opinion is, that the multitude ſhould *not* be provided for; and ſuch a doctrine, I preſume, requires no refutation. If he does agree with Mr. Burke, then, the inference he has drawn is his own, becauſe he thinks it the only one which can flow from what Mr. Burke has ſaid. It is for me to ſhew, in the firſt place, the falſity of this inference; and, in the next, that it belongs not to Mr. Burke. According to Dr. Prieſtley's principle, there ſhould be different eſtabliſhed religions under the ſame government, which is in itſelf an abſurdity. Let us ſuppoſe that the multitude in Cornwall, were Methodiſts, and in the Iſle of Man, Quakers, and the Iſle of Angleſea, Anabaptiſts; there ſhould be, according to his mode of reaſoning, ſo many different eſtabliſhed religions. Thoſe places are, as Ireland, different parts of the ſame empire, whoſe inhabitants live under the ſame conſtitution. Let us go a ſtep farther: the eſtabliſhed religion is that authoriſed by the government, and under its ſanction, and that which the government itſelf profeſſes. If, then, the Roman Catholic

were to be the eſtabliſhed religion in Ireland, the *King* muſt be a Roman Catholic with reſpect to Ireland, and a Proteſtant with reſpect to England. Thus far I have endeavoured to ſhew the falſity of Dr. Prieſtley's reaſoning: I am now to ſhew that this is not the reaſoning of Mr. Burke. In the words "the Chriſtian Stateſ-"man muſt firſt provide for the multitude," we have only to take the words "provide" and "multitude" in their ordinary meaning, and there will be no difficulty. If the Chriſtian Stateſman thinks any particular mode of worſhip improper, he cannot encourage it in the multitude, becauſe in ſuch a caſe he could not be ſaid to *provide* for the multitude; for it is nonſenſe to ſay, a man *provides* what he thinks *improper*. The word "multitude" implies nothing more than the poor, that are not able to provide for themſelves; and not the majority in any city, diſtrict, county, &c. I am here again well aware of an objection that may be ſtarted againſt me: one may ſay, that I have made Dr. Prieſtley argue to the neceſſity of *many* eſtabliſhed religions, whereas he expreſsly diſapproves of any eſtabliſhed religion at all. This proves not any inconſiſtency on my part; it only ſhews, that Dr. Prieſtley is inconſiſtent with himſelf. From one of Mr. Burke's poſitions, Dr. Prieſtley ſays,

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there is but one inference: if then he adopts the poſition, he neceſſarily adopts the inference. I have ſaid no more than this.——

Doctor Prieſtley endeavors to prove Mr. Burke inconſiſtent, in the following manner: "That ſince the Preſbyterians in Scotland, "and the Epiſcopalians in England, have "the ſame King, and the ſame Parliament, "there cannot be an inſeparable union between "Church and State." By the words "*inſepa-*"*rable union*," which Dr. Prieſtley has attributed to Mr. Burke, he thinks Mr. Burke means a natural neceſſary connection between Church and State, ſo that the one cannot exiſt without the other; and of courſe, has evidently miſtaken Mr. Burke's meaning. The queſtion is not, whether a ſtate can or cannot exiſt without a civil eſtabliſhment of religion; but whether ſuch an eſtabliſhment tends to the promotion of religion itſelf, as well as to the welfare of the ſtate. I ſhall take notice of theſe points in the next paragraph, being applied to that part of Dr. Prieſtley's work, where he ſpeaks more particularly of them. I have only to obſerve here, that all Dr. Prieſtley's arguments, that are built on this miſtaken meaning (and they form no ſmall part of his book) are manifeſtly uſeleſs: for ſuch is the fate of all attempts to prove ſelf-evident propoſitions. When Dr. Prieſtley

ſays " that Mr. Burke conſiders the Chriſtian " religion, as having no reſpectability or effect, " without being eſtabliſhed, and that the natural " human means of eſtimation in which it is " held, is the ſplendor and riches of ſuch an eſta- " bliſhment," he certainly miſtakes or miſtates Mr. Burke's meaning. I am hardy enough to aſſert, he cannot produce any ſentiments like this in Mr. Burke's book. Dr. Prieſtley evidently confounds religion itſelf, with the teachers of it. When Mr. Burke ſpeaks of the " human means of eſtimation," he does not apply them to the doctrine, but to the teachers of it. He does not excluſively apply them to eccleſiaſtics, but to all men whatſoever, and ſurely he is right; for take from any man the *means* of being independent, and you take from him the *human* means of eſtimation. Thoſe that beg are never ſo reſpected as thoſe that give, or thoſe that buy.

Dr. Prieſtley has a peculiar fancy for making ſuppoſitions for Mr. Burke, and then reaſoning from them. Addreſſing Mr. Burke, he ſays, " You muſt, no doubt, imagine that Chriſ- " tianity never exiſted without the civil eſta- " bliſhment of it, that it has *grown with its* " *growth, and ſtrengthened with its ſtrength.*" Will Dr. Prieſtley condeſcend to ſhew, on what part

part of Mr. Burke's reflections he has founded this ſuppoſition? for, I proteſt, I cannot find it. The fair point at iſſue between Mr. Burke and Dr. Prieſtley is this. Mr. Burke thinks the eſtabliſhment of religion neceſſary to its own promotion, and, of courſe, uſeful to the ſtate. Dr. Prieſtley thinks the contrary; he thinks all civil eſtabliſhments of religion uſeleſs, either for its own promotion, or the good of the ſtate. Both have one common principle; namely, that religion is neceſſary, and that the miniſters of it ought to be ſupported. They differ in their means, for the advancement of religion itſelf, and for ſupporting the miniſters of it; Mr. Burke arguing for eſtabliſhments, and Dr. Prieſtley for voluntary contributions. I ſhall offer no direct reaſons in ſupport of Mr. Burke's poſitions; becauſe any man that has read him, could but little reliſh any thing I am able to offer on the ſubject. I ſhall, therefore, confine myſelf to Dr. Prieſtley's reaſoning, and ſhall endeavor to ſhew its invalidity.

Dr. Prieſtley endeavors to prove his poſitions by analogy. He ſays, that "in the primitive ages "of Chriſtianity there was no eſtabliſhment of "it, and that it flouriſhed;" and that "all the "contributions that were made, for the mainte-

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"nance of public worſhip, were made by the "rich; and they were as ample as they were "voluntary." Again, he intimates, that ſince the Preſbyterian miniſters in this country, are ſupported by contribution, ſo may the miniſters of the eſtabliſhed church.—As to the firſt of thoſe analogies, I have to obſerve, that it is unfair; becauſe the circumſtances of the things compared are very different. Will Dr. Prieſtley make no allowance for the difference in manners, habits, opinions, &c. between the primitive Chriſtians, and thoſe of the preſent day? Chriſtianity, in thoſe ages, ſtood in no need of civil eſtabliſhments; becauſe it operated, not only by its own intrinſic goodneſs, but by the badneſs and abſurdity of other ſyſtems. Beſides, it was impoſſible that it could have been immediately eſtabliſhed in thoſe ages; for the long accumulating prejudices of the human mind cannot be annihilated in a moment. In the moral world, there can be no inſtantaneous tranſitions from darkneſs to light, from ignorance to knowledge; from abſurdity to wiſdom: no wonder, then, that Chriſtianity was not eſtabliſhed in the commencement of thoſe tranſitions: in their completion it was; and this alone, I conceive to be, no ſlight proof of the utility of eſtabliſhments; ſince they were the effect of

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the tranſition from darkneſs to light, from ignorance to knowledge, and from abſurdity to wiſdom; the work, in ſhort, of the human mind in its illuminated, and not its foggy ſtate. Dr. Prieſtley farther ſays, that ſince, in the primitive ages, the Chriſtian religion was perſecuted, and nevertheleſs flouriſhed, it follows that, now that it is not perſecuted, it ſtands in no need of eſtabliſhment. This inference I alſo deny; becauſe its perſecution was the means of its proſperity: it attracted to it, the notice of mankind; this notice naturally led men to inveſtigate the cauſes of ſuch perſecution, and ſeeing no *reaſon* for it, but, on the contrary, diſcovering the great ſuperiority of Chriſtianity over other ſyſtems, they were neceſſarily induced to ſupport it, and this they did by voluntary contributions, the *only* means by which it could have been maintained at that time.

As to the ſecond of Dr. Prieſtley's analogies, namely, that the Preſbyterian clergy at this day, and in this country, are ſupported by contribution, I have alſo to obſerve, that this, again, is an unfair argument; becauſe it concludes from the part to the whole. It by no means follows, that becauſe one particular ſect is ſupported by voluntary contribution, that all ſects would be likewiſe ſupported: nay, more, I can eaſily conceive

conceive a ſect's being ſupported, only and merely becauſe in oppoſition to the eſtabliſhed church. But were there no eſtabliſhed church, and of courſe no oppoſition, the caſe, I fear, would be extremely different. Perhaps nor the one, nor the other, would be maintained at all; particularly if we go on Dr. Prieſtley's principle, of the church being ſupported by "the "voluntary and ample contributions of the "rich."—Since Dr. Prieſtley allows that religion is neceſſary, and that the miniſters of it ought to be ſupported, I think, he is, in fact, arguing for eſtabliſhments, at the moment he is declaiming againſt them. For, if it be *neceſſary*, that any body of men be *ſupported*, the means of ſuch ſupport ſhould be *certain*; but from *voluntary* contributions never can be inferred certain ſupport: from eſtabliſhments it can. On Dr. Prieſtley's own principle, then, in my humble opinion, ſhould the civil eſtabliſhment of religion exiſt.

Dr. Prieſtley has a peculiar fancy for a multiplicity of ſects. He ſeems particularly to admire the Methodiſts, on whom he paſſes the moſt unbounded encomiums. He, however, unfortunately concludes a long paragraph, written in their praiſe, in the following very remarkable words. "I wiſh they had more

"*knowledge*

" *knowledge* and more *charity* along with their " zeal; and theſe will come in due time." Thoſe qualities I had ever conceived eſſentially requiſite in a true preacher of the goſpel. One of them is abſolutely neceſſary to form the character of a good man; there can be no goodneſs without it. Since, then, thoſe men are deficient in *knowledge* and *charity*, they are not ſurely proper ſubjects for panegyric. But Dr. Prieſtley ſpeculates on the attainment of thoſe qualities. He had acted, ſurely, with more conſiſtency, in ſuſpending his eulogium until the qualities had arrived. For my own part, I ſhould be ſorry to ſay that any ſet of men may not become more learned and more charitable than they are at preſent; but with reſpect to thoſe men, of whom Dr. Prieſtley ſpeaks, I am ſure that they will continue ignorant and uncharitable, as long as they continue in the habits of thinking that made them ſo.

Dr. Prieſtley's encomiums on the Methodiſts, are followed by the moſt ungentlemanly, and, of courſe, moſt impotent invective againſt the miniſters of the eſtabliſhed church. " By the confeſſion " of many perſons in the eſtabliſhed church," he ſays, " there are no clergy in Chriſtendom more " negligent of their proper duty, leſs ſtrict in " their morals, and conſequently *more deſpiſed* than

" they are." This is not all, he ſpeaks of them in many places in ſuch terms, as, with common principles of charity, and the ordinary uſage of the world, I ſhould bluſh to apply to the moſt incorrigible and abandoned wretch that ever diſgraced human ſociety. In ſhort, there is no term of degradation or debaſement that he has not profuſely laviſhed on them. They are, in his mind, not only ſinners themſelves, but are the cringing, ſervile accomplices in the ſins of others. They are, in fact, according to Dr. Prieſtley's merciful ſtatement, nothing leſs than ſinners by ſympathy. There is ſomething in this ſtyle of abuſe (for invective I cannot call it) that is peculiarly revolting. There is ſomething in this hardy attack upon an entire order of the community, and with us at leaſt, a reſpectable one, that might look like madneſs in an unknown individual, but is pityful, nay, diſguſting in a man of liberal profeſſion, and of liberal education. The miniſters of our eſtabliſhed church, are, in general, men of talents and of cultivated underſtandings, and diſtinguiſhed more than other men, for the exemplary manners and habits of their lives. They are loved and revered among us. It is nothing leſs than outrage to *our* feelings to call thoſe deſpicable we think reſpectable, to call thoſe vicious

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we think virtuous, to call thoſe infamous we think honorable. It is a daring libel on our heads and our hearts, to call thoſe we look up to with reverence, nothing leſs than profligate wretches, cringing ſlaves, and canting hypocrites. It is, thank Heaven, the nature of unprovoked calumny to be moſt impotent when it looks moſt fierce. Dr. Prieſtley's encomiums on the diſſenting clergy are ill placed. They were, no doubt, intended as a contraſt. I am far from blaming him for praiſing either his own mode of faith, or the miniſters of it. I know it is natural and amiable to do ſo. I am very willing to believe that there are among the Diſſenters many worthy and many able men. I have myſelf known ſome that I eſteem, and ſhall eſteem as long as I exiſt. They will, I believe, be but little obliged to Dr. Prieſtley for the means he has taken to ſerve their cauſe. He has aſſumed a tone that does not become him. If I have any idea of the character of the Engliſh, I know it is impoſſible to *force* them. It is not impoſſible to perſuade them. Threats are, with them, but poor ſubſtitutes for entreaties.

Dr. Prieſtley treats with great ridicule, Mr. Burke's idea that "religion is the baſis of civil "ſociety, and the ſource of all good, and all "comfort." Dr. Prieſtley pleaſantly aſks, will

"religion feed or cloath us? And is there no "comfort in feeding or clothing?" Religion will not feed or cloath us; but it can do more;" it can comfort us if we are not fed, or if we are not clothed; and in this ſenſe, in my opinion, is the word *comfort* moſt properly applied. Again, he ſays, "Is it not poſſible "to make many wholeſome laws, to prevent "men from injuring one another, ſo as to pre- "ſerve the peace of ſociety, which I conceive "to be, the proper end of civil government, "without calling in the aid of religion?" This argument is founded on a falſe principle, and one degrading to human nature; becauſe it ſuppoſes that laws can operate, only by their penalties. Without religion I can conceive no peace in ſociety; for however ſanguinary the laws may be, their penalties alone will not be ſufficient for their obſervance. It is religion that makes us what we are, that humanizes us, that renders us in proſperity moderate, and in calamity reſigned.

Dr. Prieſtley treats Mr. Burke's objections to an elective clergy as ill founded. "Is it "not true" he ſays, "that in all caſes of a "civil nature, every perſon who receives a ſa- "lary for any duty whatſoever, will be more "attentive to that duty, when the perſon who

"pays

" pays the ſalary, and who is intereſted in the " proper diſcharge of the duty, has the power " of appointing and diſmiſſing him? The reaſon " is obvious; it then becomes the intereſt, both " of the perſon who performs the duty, and the " perſon who is benefitted by it, that it be well " done "—On this principle, not only the monarchy, but every place under government ſhould be elective; for ſince it is the people that ultimately pay all the ſalaries, and that are ultimately to be benefitted by the proper diſcharge of the duties for which the ſalaries are given ſo, according to Dr. Prieſtley, they ſhould have the power of appointing whom they pleaſe, and diſmiſſing him when they pleaſe. This doctrine is in itſelf ſo weak, that a ſerious refutation of it, would give it a conſequence it cannot deſerve:—the uniform experience of mankind has long ſince exploded it. What innumerable evils has not one of the fineſt countries under heaven ſuffered from the adoption of only ſmall part of this doctrine, and ſo thoroughly are the inhabitants convinced of this truth, that they are at this moment willing to relinquiſh their right of election, and make the Crown of Poland for ever hereditary.

Mr. Burke dreads a ſcene of faction, and of low intrigue, among the clergy, who ſhould be candidates for places in the church. Theſe

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apprehenſions, in my mind, ſo reaſonably founded, Dr. Prieſtley conceives to be very vain indeed; and the only reaſon he gives is this. "Among the Diſſenters there is no ſuch thing "as canvaſſing at all, any ſuch thing would be "an effectual bar to the canvaſſer's election." —Thus we ſee Dr. Prieſtley, with all his powers of reaſoning, obliged to recur to his old argument (analogy), and drawing all his logical reſources from the inexhauſtible virtues and perfections of the Diſſenters. But I, who am not a Diſſenter, and of courſe incapable of reliſhing arguments, drawn from perfection, of which I have no idea, muſt beg leave to reaſon in a more homely manner. Although the benefices in France will not be thought worth acquiring to men of condition, and of enlarged ideas, they will be, however, objects to thoſe whoſe talents and education, and habits of life, preclude any hopes of their arriving at more lucrative or more honorable places. Since, then, thoſe benefices are objects to ſome men, they will endeavor to acquire them by what they conſider the moſt probable means. The queſtion conſequently narrows itſelf to this. What are conſidered by candidates in general, the moſt likely means of arriving at objects, that are in the diſpoſal of the people? I believe, the experience of this, and every other country, clearly ſhews

that

that when each individual has a vote, canvaſſing has been the ordinary means of acquiring that vote. Now, ſince in France, it is probable, that only thoſe of low condition and unenlarged ideas, will be candidates for the benefices, I adopt Mr. Burke's idea of intrigue, with its epithets of *low* and *illiberal*. In what I have ſaid on this ſubject, I think I have reaſoned from the *probable* operation and effect of the human paſſions; and until Dr. Prieſtley ſucceeds in transfuſing the excluſive virtues of the Diſſenters, into the minds of all the people of France, and thereby deſtroying this *probable* operation and effect, I muſt beg leave to continue in my preſent opinion, that the elective benefices will be an object of *low* and *illiberal* intrigue.

Mr. Burke ſays, "that the preſent ruling "power of France, has made a degrading pen- "ſionary eſtabliſhment, to which no man of "liberal ideas, or liberal condition, will deſtine "his children." This Dr. Prieſtley denies, on his former ground, and by his former analogy. "Though few of our ſalaries," he ſays, "will "more than half maintain us, there are not want- "ing perſons of independent fortune, and liberal "education, who voluntarily devote themſelves "to the work of our miniſtry." Allowing all Dr. Prieſtley's poſitions their full extent, and believing as I do, that Diſſenters of independent fortune,

and liberal education, voluntarily devote themſelves to the work of their miniſtry, it does not at all follow, that this will be the caſe throughout the kingdom of France. Rejecting therefore this inference, as abſolutely nugatory, let us examine Mr. Burke's opinion, on the only fair ground on which it can be conſidered: let us examine it on the ground of probability. When any man of *liberal ideas* and *liberal condition*, deſtines his children for a public profeſſion, what are the moſt weighty conſiderations that in general preſent themſelves to his mind? Honor and emolument. Now let us apply this principle to the eccleſiaſtical benefices in France. Since, on Dr. Prieſtley's own confeſſion, the clergy are not to be conſidered in any other light than as ſervants, that are to be appointed, paid and diſmiſſed at the diſcretion of their "employers," it is impoſſible that the eccleſiaſtical profeſſion can be adopted by any man of liberal condition, and liberal ideas, barely for the *honor* that is neceſſarily attendant on it. Now for the ſecond point—emolument. Since the parochial clergy in France are paid a yearly ſtipend of twelve hundred livres, about 46*l.* ſterling, and no more, and ſince the higheſt benefice in the country (the biſhopricks excepted) amounts to no more than ſix thouſand livres, about two hundred and forty pounds ſterling per annum,

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it is equally impoſſible that any man of liberal condition will deſtine his children to this profeſſion, merely from a conſideration of its emoluments.

I confeſs it ſurprifes me not a little, that in all Dr. Prieſtley's reaſoning upon theſe ſubjects, I have not been able to diſcover one ſingle argument *à priori*. If any man can falſify what I have now ſaid, I ſolemnly declare that, for the benefit of the public, I ſhall never write again—I have ſelected, as far as I could diſcover, from Dr. Prieſtley's Letters, his ſtrongeſt points. He dwells on the virtues of the Diſſenters, not as a man pleaſed with the beauty of an object that intereſts him, but as one who would make ſuch virtues the ſtrong grounds from which to draw ſtrong inferences. In vain, then, ſhall he expect from the bulk of mankind, thoſe virtues and endowments that are to be found in the ſect to which he belongs. As long as men continue as they are, they will in a great meaſure yield to the impulſe of their paſſions. Some will intrigue for places, when by it they think they may arrive at their point; for virtue alone will not always ſucceed in popular elections. Others will look with ſcorn at the objects of ſuch intrigue. But all liberal men will naturally ap-

ply themſelves, to that profeſſion, from which they are to expect *honor* and *emolument*.

In no one part of Dr. Prieſtley's work, does he diſcover ſuch weakneſs, and miſconception as in his remarks on Mr. Burke's reaſoning, concerning monaſtic inſtitutions; but more particularly on the meaning of the word "*power*". —Mr. Burke ſays, "a Politician to do great "things looks for a *power*, what our workmen "call a purchaſe, and if he finds that power, in "politics as in mechanics, he cannot be at a loſs "to apply it. In the monaſtic inſtitution, in my "opinion, was found a great *power*, for the me-"chaniſm of politic benevolence." Again, "to "deſtroy any power, growing wild from the rank "productive force of the human mind, is almoſt "tantamount in the moral world, to the de-"ſtruction of the apparently active properties of "bodies in the material." To this Dr. Prieſtley replies that "upon this principle of no *power* "to be deſtroyed, but only to be *regulated*, the "greateſt abuſes may be perpetuated; becauſe "in many caſes there is no preventing the abuſe, "without deſtroying the power itſelf. Such, "for example, is the claim of the Pope, to uni-"verſal dominion, over the Chriſtian church, "and even over temporal Princes; in fact the "*aſſumption of all power in heaven and in earth.*

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"Such alſo is the power of a prieſt, to give "abſolution of ſins." Is it not clear, that Dr. Prieſtley has confounded two very diſtinct ideas? If it be not, I ſhall endeavor to make it ſo—Mr. Burke, we ſee, ſuppoſes in the monaſtic inſtitutions, a *power* or *purchaſe*; now the right uſe or application of any *power* or *purchaſe*, muſt be beneficial: it is *impoſſible* it can be otherwiſe. The word "*power*," then, taken in this ſenſe, means the capability of producing certain good effects, by a right uſe or application. Will any man ſay that ſuch a power ſhould be deſtroyed? The lever is, in the material world, a power, which by a right uſe or application is highly beneficial: nobody will ſay, I truſt, that the lever if it could, ought to be deſtroyed.—Dr. Prieſtley's idea of power, is as different from this, as any two ideas can be. It means nothing more nor leſs than *authority*, as may be manifeſtly ſeen from the *choſen* inſtances he has given, for its illuſtration. Can any man exiſting (except himſelf) call the "claim of "the Pope to univerſal dominion" a *power* or *purchaſe*. Dr. Prieſtley might, with as much conſiſtency, confound the diſtinct diſſimilar ideas, of a *wedge*, and the *command* of a man of war; for they are both *powers*, but of a totally different nature; the firſt ſignifying a

purchaſe, the ſecond ſignifying *authority*.—All Dr. Prieſtley's reaſoning, then, that is founded (to uſe the moſt charitable epithet) on this moſt flagrant miſconception, is abſolutely uſeleſs. One of his Letters is almoſt taken up with it. Mr. Burke will, no doubt, have read the letter, and not have found much *news*.

"In this enlightened age," Mr. Burke ſays, "I am bold enough to confeſs that we are ge-"nerally men of untaught feelings; that, inſtead "of caſting away all our old prejudices, we "cheriſh them to a very conſiderable degree, "and to take more ſhame to ourſelves, we "cheriſh them becauſe they are prejudices, and "the longer they have laſted, and the more "generally they have prevailed, the more we "cheriſh them." "On this principle, then," ſays Dr. Prieſtley, "had Mr. Burke been a Pagan, "at the time of the promulgation of Chriſtianity, "he would have continued one." Here, again, I beg leave to ſay that Dr. Prieſtley has moſt groſsly miſtaken Mr. Burke, and here again, has he confounded two diſtinct ideas. Mr. Burke ſpeaks of prejudices connected with reaſon; Dr. Prieſtley ſpeaks of prejudices that are in themſelves irrational. I challenge Dr. Prieſtley to ſhew one expreſſion in Mr. Burke's Reflections, where the cheriſhing of irrational pre-

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judices is recommended. On the contrary, Mr. Burke ſays, "Prejudice with its *reaſon*, has a "motive to give action to that *reaſon*, and an "affection, that gives it permanence." Again, "Prejudice renders a man's *virtue* his habit; "and not a ſeries of unconnected acts. Through "*juſt* prejudice, his *duty* becomes a part of his "nature." On this ground I ſhall have no difficulty in telling Dr. Prieſtley, that Mr. Burke would have continued a Pagan, at the time of the promulgation of chriſtianity, had reaſon coincided with prejudice.

Dr. Prieſtley in his reaſoning on the revenues of the church aſſumes a principle which I cannot allow him: he ſays that the property of the church belongs to the public. Dr. Prieſtley adduces no argument in ſupport of his poſition: indeed he attempts it not; it is with him, nothing leſs than a thing to be taken for granted. I am forced to differ from him. In a former part of this work, I have endeavoured to ſhew, why the property of the church ought to be conſidered as private property, and of courſe ſo ſacred, that no legiſlature under heaven has the right to ſeize or confiſcate it. Dr. Prieſtley ſeems to think Mr. Burke convicted on his own aſſertion, when he ſays, "When once the com-"monwealth has eſtabliſhed the eſtates of the

"church

"church as property, it can, conſiſtently, hear "nothing of the more or the leſs."—"This then," Dr. Prieſtley ſays, "implies that the eſtates of "the church, are in the gift of the common-"wealth or ſtate; and what the ſtate has *given*, "it may ſurely *take away*."—On this point, I am fairly at iſſue with Dr. Prieſtley, for I ſay what the ſtate has once *given* it cannot *take away*. When I ſay *cannot*, it is evident I mean, *ought not*, becauſe we are ſpeaking, not of powers, but of rights.—The very word *gift* precludes the idea of any right of *retraction*. Any thing *lawfully given* cannot be *forcibly reſumed*. On this head, I think, I ſpeak according to the law and conſtitution of England. *Gifts* are of two kinds: *abſolute* and *conditional*. Now, if the *gift* of the property of the church, was abſolute, there can be no right of *retraction* at all. If it was conditional, then, there can be no right of *retraction*, as long as the *conditions* are performed. To elucidate this by an example which I conceive in point.—The legiſlature of Ireland voted to Mr. Grattan, the ſum of fifty thouſand pounds, for his parliamentary exertions. Here, then, is an inſtance of property being *given* by the *ſtate*. On Dr. Prieſtley's principle, the ſtate has a right to take back this ſum, becauſe it was the ſtate that *gave* it. I ſay it has not; for property

once given by the ſtate, loſes its quality of *public*, and abſolutely becomes *private*.

Dr. Prieſtley has not been ſatisfied, with loading the clergy of the eſtabliſhed church with the moſt degrading and opprobrious terms that ever ſullied the language either of a charitable or an enlightened man, but alſo treats the eſtabliſhed church in ſuch a manner, as would diſgrace even libertiniſm, and diſguſt even indecency itſelf. The following tranſcripts from him I offer to the peruſal of my readers—Exultingly ſpeaking of the certain deſtruction that attends our church, he ſays, "this danger from *without* "is uncertain, and may be warded off; but not "ſo that from *within*. I mean the growing light "of the age, in conſequence of which we are "more and more ſenſible of the abſurdity of the "doctrines, the inſufficiency of the diſcipline, "and the oppreſſion of the revenues of your "church. The people of this country will, "at length, diſcover that what they have paid "ſo dearly for as a *benefit*, is really a *nuiſance*, "that it is hoſtile to the *cleareſt truth*, and ſubverſe of rational liberty." This "growing "light of the age," he ſays, muſt come from the Diſſenters; for in the next line he tells us, that "Diſſenters of one denomination or other, "are very much increaſed of late years." Again,

"Let

"Let thinking people, then, judge what muſt "be the fate of a church whoſe fundamental "doctrines are diſbelieved by men of ſenſe and "enquiry." There is ſomething in this man's manner, in comparison of which preſumption is meekneſs, inſolence is humility, and intemperance is moderation. The moſt alarming heights of Roman profligacy, the moſt abandoned moments of immorality and irreligion never provoked, with ſo much juſtice, the unſparing but virtuous ſeverity of the immortal Juvenal; as the eſtabliſhed religion of this country, the glorious object of our paſt ſtruggles, the pure ſource of our preſent conſolation, undeſervedly draws forth the ſpiteful, but impotent attacks of this ſelf-created apoſtle of the eighteenth century. The diffuſion of truth never was dreaded with more anxiety, or deprecated with more zeal by cunning ſuperſtition, than the downfall of *our* church is, by this man, wiſhed for with impious ſincerity, and predicted with inſolent aſſurance. The tranſitions from Paganiſm to Chriſtianity, from ignorance to knowledge, from abſurdity to wiſdom, never have been ſo glorious and tranſcendant as that we are now going to experience (even in this enlightened age) from the inconceivable light, the incalculable knowledge, the inexhauſtible wiſdom

of

of the heaven-favored Diſſenters alone. Theſe men, it ſeems, want but an excluſive patent from God, for being *men* without being *ſinners*. Much may be expected from their preſumption. They will, no doubt, ſend an embaſſy to heaven for the purpoſe. We may yet expect to ſee committees of ſaints upon earth. The National Aſſembly too, are making long ſtrides to canonization. Mirabeau has begun to preach already. *We* plain men look not for more than human illumination. We have examined the articles of our faith, and we are ſatisfied with them. We think our religion the beſt ſuited to public peace and private happineſs. We are attached to our religion. We love not thoſe that deſpiſe it. Dr. Prieſtley tells us our religion *muſt* be deſtroyed. This misfortune, I hope, will not befall us, until Mirabeau becomes a ſaint, and Dr. Prieſtley becomes a *modeſt* one.

I am now to take notice of the charge of inconſiſtency, laid by his *enemies* againſt Mr. Burke. The grounds on which they would found it, are his conduct on the American war, and the regency. To prove the firſt they argue thus:

How comes it, that he who ſo violently ſupported the rights of independence in America, ſhall become the avowed enemy of independence

in France? Mr. Burke recommended to *give* in the *beginning*, what he knew could not in the *end* be refuſed. Mr Burke recommended advantageous accommodation, in the moment of victory, inſtead of extorted terms in the hour of defeat. Mr. Burke foreſaw the conſequences of proud but unavailing obſtinacy: and the event has juſtified his predictions. But taking the ſubject up, in another point of view, on the plain obvious meaning of independence; let me aſk in what part of Mr. Burke's book does he diſapprove of independence? In what part of his book does he ſay, the French are independent? unleſs the total inſecurity of property, a confirmed contempt for religion, and the unexampled degradation of their King be independence. In no one part of Mr. Burke's book can I find any other independence than this. This is no doubt independence, but it is independence on goodneſs, on honor, on wiſdom, on juſtice, on every quality that can adorn the human mind. Where then is Mr. Burke's inconſiſtency?

The ſecond ground on which his enemies found Mr. Burke's inconſiſtency, is, his conduct on the regency; and to prove it, they argue thus:

How comes it, that he, who treated the Monarch

Monarch with ſo little reſpect, ſhall now be the warm aſſertor of monarchic rights. I defy the united efforts of active enmity and ingenious malevolence, to ſhew one ſingle expreſſion, one ſingle act of Mr. Burke's political life, in which he has attacked the *lawful* prerogatives of the crown. His very *enemies* furniſh the ſtrongeſt of all poſſible arguments in favor of his *conſiſtency*. His conduct on the regency, ſo far from affording even conjecture againſt him, is the moſt unequivocal proof of the unvaried (and I truſt, and I am ſure, invariable) inflexibility of his principles. If the merits of his Sovereign were not the ſubject of his panegyric, the *rights* of the Crown were the object of his ſincere and vigorous exertion. If (to ſay the worſt of it) an unguarded warmth extorted from him ſome perſonal reflections on the King, an enlightened reaſon conducted him in aſſerting the mutilated rights of the monarchy. If the then ſituation of George the Third, drew not from him the language of pity and condolence, the future poſition of the executive power, ſtruck him with thoſe *honourable* fears that *honeſt* jealouſy feels at the proſpect of approaching danger, and alarmed him into his *own* eloquence—that hardens the conviction, while it melts the feelings of his hearers. This was the con-

duct of a man, who lives for meaſures, and not for men. This was the conduct of a man, who, while he diſregarded the perſon, honorably combats for the only *rights*, that can give dignity and conſolation to that perſon. This was the conduct of a man, that George the Third *may* not thank for himſelf, but will thank in the name of his heirs and ſucceſſors to all eternity. A more glorious recompence awaits him: fourteen millions, and the future millions of fourteen millions, will bleſs him, as the aſſertor of their rights. He has eſtabliſhed, I truſt, on a permanent foundation, their claim to the happieſt conſtitution upon earth—a conſtitution that anſwers every purpoſe that *men* can expect from the work of *men*—a conſtitution that it is dangerous to tamper with—a conſtitution on which experiment is hazardous, and on which experiment muſt be, of courſe, a crime—a conſtitution, the people, I truſt, will not abandon for the gaudy, but brittle principle of electing governors, and caſhiering them for miſconduct.

I am now to take notice of a more general, although effectually the ſame charge, a charge maliciouſly invented by Mr. Burke's enemies, and adopted by ſome who know nothing of the matter: namely, his deſertion from Whiggiſm.

They

They ſay Mr. Burke is not a Whig, never was a Whig, and always was a Tory. I ſay Mr. Burke is a Whig, always was a Whig, and never was a Tory. Were any man to aſk thoſe gentlemen what Whiggiſm meant, I will be bound to ſay, that but a few could tell what it is, and that much the greater part could ſcarcely tell what was their idea of it. It will be no ſmall ſource of honor and of conſolation, to thoſe laſt-mentioned gentlemen, to ſay, that they poor fellows are calumniators from faſhion, and not from principle. Whiggiſm I humbly conceive to be, a jealous attachment to the conſtitution, as ſettled at the Revolution. On this principle, Mr. Burke is the beſt Whig, and Mr. Burke's book the moſt Whiggiſh book in the language. From the beginning to the end of it, he never once loſes ſight of the conſtitution as ſettled at the Revolution; it is the key-ſtone of all his poſitions, of all his reaſoning, and of all his affections. His imagination, unbounded by any other given point in the univerſe, is ſlaviſhly fettered by this. He, then is, inconſiſtent, that accuſes Mr. Burke of inconſiſtency: he is not a Whig, that ſays Mr. Burke is not a Whig; he is not an honeſt man, that ſays that Mr. Burke is not a virtuous Whig.

In

In moſt publications of this nature, mens political attachments are eaſily diſcovered. I I have none. I am *politically* attached to no *man*. I am attached, only to opinions. I am a Foxite. I believe Mr. Fox to be one of the greateſt and honeſteſt miniſters that ever exiſted; therefore am I a Foxite. I know and acknowledge no other reaſon than this. Mr. Pitt is certainly a very able ſtateſman, and a very wonderful man: I mean him no diſparagement, by ſaying, that Mr. Fox is a more able ſtateſman, and a leſs wonderful man.

If this vindication of Mr. Burke, ſhould be thought weak and unworthy of him, my motives for undertaking it, are at leaſt irreproachable. I never ſaw Mr. Burke but once. I ſaw him from the gallery of the Houſe of Commons. I know no man that knows him. I probably ſhall know no man that knows him. In a few weeks I leave this country, perhaps never to return. I expect but little from any man. I ſhall never aſk any thing. In whatever country I may live, in whatever ſituation I may be placed, I ſhall look down on *grandeur*, I ſhall look up to *greatneſs*. Nor wealth, nor rank, nor power, nor influence, ſhall bend my ſtubborn neck. I am proſtrate before talents. I am proſtrate before worth.

My

My admiration of Mr. Burke, amounts almoſt to enthuſiaſm. My involuntary praiſes of him have, by their frequency and ſincerity, almoſt worked themſelves in among the habits of my life. If there be greatneſs and virtue among men, Mr. Burke is, in my mind, great and virtuous—my confidence in his talents, and his honor, is unbounded. Were the government of the country, in which I lived, entruſted to his care, I ſhould have no political anxieties: I could almoſt diſpenſe with my right of thinking for myſelf, on the means of being politically free, and of courſe, politically happy. Should Mr. Burke but chance to read this book, and then not quarrel with its title—I aſk no more—I am ſatisfied—I am recompenſed.

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